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Comments
HUDDLE UP: SURVEYING THE PLAYING FIELD ON THE
SINGLE ENTITY STATUS OF THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE IN ANTICIPATION OF
AMERICAN NEEDLE V NFL
I. INTRODUCTION
Baseball has long been recognized as "America's Pastime,"
even by those who cannot tell the difference between a center
fielder and a center forward.' Baseball is America's oldest major
sport and has long held a place in the hearts of sports fans. 2 In
recent years, however, football has clearly emerged as modern
America's most popular sport.3 In the last decade, the National
Football League ("NFL") has experienced an unparalleled surge in
fan turnout and viewer support.4 This surge has led to increased
profits from broadcast revenues, merchandise sales, advertising,
and other sources. 5
1. See Bryan Curtis, Debating America's Pastime(s), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/sports/Oliht-Olcur-
tis.19835372.html (suggesting baseball is being overtaken by football as America's
pastime).
2. See generally Historic Baseball Resources, http://www.loc.gov/topics/base-
ball/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) (describing baseball's history).
3. See In a League of its Own, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2006, available at http://
www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=6859210 ("[Amer-
ican Football] remains the most popular of the four big American sports on almost
every measure, from opinion polls to television ratings."); see also Kurt
Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian, and Christina Settimi, The Business of Football,
FORBES, Sept. 13, 2007, available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/09/13/nfl-team-
valuations-biz-07nfl-cz kb mo-cs_0913nflland.html ("The NFL... beats the day-
lights out of other prime-time programming, including every other sport.").
4. See The Business of Football, supra note 3 ("Nearly three out of every four
Americans watched an NFL game on television last season."); see also Sean Leahy,
Blackout Blues? NFL Ticket Sales Slumping in Some Cities, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 2009,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2009-08-31-nfl-tick-
etsN.htm (noting many teams have sold out their stadiums for 2009-10 NFL sea-
son and kept ticket prices steady with previous years despite economic turmoil).
5. See In a League of its Own, supra note 3 ("As a business, American football
has been beating its rivals handily for years. It has the highest total revenues of the
four (major sports leagues], at nearly $6 billion a year."). Even at the team level,
NFL teams have a market value of roughly 4.0 times revenues, which dwarfs the
teams in other leagues that average between 2.2 and 3.0. See id. (discussing finan-
cial superiority of NFL teams when compared to other sports); see also The Business
of Football, supra note 3 ("The NFL is the richest sports league in the world, with the
average team worth some $957 million.").
(529)
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Indeed, as another football season approaches, it is quite ap-
propriate to label the NFL not only as America's most popular
sport, but also as its most lucrative. 6 The level of popularity and
financial success that the NFL is currently enjoying, however, has
not come without costs. 7 Namely, the ever-increasing skepticism re-
garding the legal legitimacy of the NFL's organization as a business
enterprise has made the federal courthouse the league's new play-
ing field. 8 The NFL views itself as a single entity, and conducts busi-
ness as such, while others argue that the NFL is a group of separate
but interrelated firms.9 The conflict surrounding this disagreement
has resulted in protracted litigation, which has imposed a heavy fi-
nancial burden on the NFL.10
The NFL's most recent defense of its single entity status came
via the Seventh Circuit's decision in American Needle Inc. v. National
Football League ("American Needle"). 11 In American Needle, the Seventh
Circuit found in favor of the NFL and against the antitrust plaintiff,
American Needle. 12 This article is concerned with the ultimate is-
sue dealt with by the court: whether the NFL should be considered
6. See In a League of its Own, supra note 3 (proclaiming NFL's dominance of
American sport-entertainment market). Indeed, the NFL is, in many respects, su-
perior to England's Premier League, arguably the most popular international
sports league. See id. (comparing NFL to English Premier League); see also The
Business of Football, supra note 3 ("Pro football is ... the most profitable sport on
the planet (mean operating income in 2006 was $17.8 million on $204 million in
revenue).").
7. See, e.g., Vito Stellino, Taking a Big Hit - legal problems offootball players, FOOT-
BALL DIGEST (Aug. 2000) available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOFC
L/is1029/ai_62804723/ (noting NFL's success as well as its problems).
8. See Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of
Section I to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REv. 219, 269-70
(1984) [hereinafter Roberts UCLA Article] (noting burden on NFL of defending
many antitrust lawsuits). Dean Roberts notes that former NFL commissioner Pete
Rozelle has testified before Congress that, "'Antitrust [has] exploded in profes-
sional sports, and antitrust litigation has since become a major, almost daily activity
of the League." Id. Commissioner Rozelle also lamented that, "I have probably
spent more time in courtrooms, in depositions, and in litigation matters than
many members of the Bar." Id. Another sports commentator has noted that, "The
NFL is a popular target for antitrust cases large and small." Lester Munson, Anti-
trust Case Could be Armageddon, ESPN.coM, July 17, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.
com/espn/columns/story?columnist=munsonlester&id=4336261.
9. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, American Needle (No. 08-661)
[hereinafter Oral Argument] (identifying arguments of NFL and opponents).
10. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 271-72 (noting threat and ex-
pense of antitrust litigation impose heavy burden on NFL); Munson, supra note 8
(considering NFL's antitrust battles).
11. 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).
12. See id. at 744 (affirming judgment of district court against American
Needle).
[Vol. 17: p. 529
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a single entity or a group of separate companies. 13 As the Seventh
Circuit indicated, confusion among the circuits has solidified the
idea that the correct application of antitrust law to the NFL is an
issue ripe for Supreme Court review. 14 As a result, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in this matter and rendered a decision on
May 24, 2010.15
This Comment analyzes the antitrust issues presented by the
NFL's organizational makeup and operating strategy.16 This com-
ment is limited to analysis of the NFL because of its unique nature
and because it is the league involved in the matter before the Su-
preme Court.1 7 Additionally, this comment is limited to analysis of
the NFL under Section I of the Sherman Act and the "Single Entity"
issue.' 8
13. See id. at 741 (considering issue raised by American Needle or whether
district court incorrectly concluded that NFL teams constitute single entity when
collectively licensing their intellectual property).
14. See id. (noting NFL's uniqueness when it comes to antitrust law and circuit
court confusion from lack of definitive decision by Supreme Court); Lee Goldman,
Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REv. 751,761 (1989) [herein-
after Goldman Article] ("Despite the consistent unwillingness of the judiciary to
adopt the single entity theory... commentators have reasonably argued that there
are legitimate bases for questioning existing law: the absence of a Supreme Court
ruling on the subject [and] the partial reliance on the now repudiated intra-enter-
prise conspiracy doctrine.")
15. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129
S.Ct. 2859 (U.S. 2009) (granting certiorari in American Needle). Surprisingly, after
winning below, the NFL actually endorsed American Needle's petition for certio-
rari. See Munson, supra note 8 ("[In a stunning development, the NFL told the
Supreme Court it endorsed American Needle's request for a hearing and a deci-
sion. The league's attorneys announced, in a remarkable understatement, that
they 'are taking the unusual step of supporting' American Needle's effort to have
the case reviewed at the highest level.").
16. For a further discussion of the antitrust issues facing the NFL, see infra
notes 105-220 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the unique nature of the NFL, see infra notes
64-70 and accompanying text. The NFL is also the league that has garnered the
most attention in terms of antitrust litigation. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note
8, at 269-70 (discussing NFL's involvement in antitrust litigation).
18. For a further discussion of Section I single entity analysis of the NFL, see
infra notes 105-220 and accompanying text. The analysis is limited to Section I and
the "single entity" issue, primarily, because that was the issue squarely addressed by
the Seventh Circuit in American Needle. See American Needle, 538 F.3d at 741 (ad-
dressing plaintiff's claim under Section I that NFL teams constitute single entity).
Also, the "single entity" issue will be the one considered by the Supreme Court
when it reviews American Needle. See Munson, supra note 8 ("The legal doctrine at
the center of the case is known as "single entity."); Dan Fletcher, Five Supreme Court
Cases to Watch this Term, TIME, Oct. 5, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,1927760,00.html ("The fundamental question for the
Court to decide [in American Needle] is whether the NFL should be considered a
single entity or a collection of 32 individual businesses."). American Needle also
agrees that the single entity status of the NFL is the issue for the Supreme Court to
20101
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Section II will provide an overview of the Sherman Act, the rel-
evant precedent on the issues involved, and the NFL, paying partic-
ular attention to the factors that make the league so unique for
antitrust purposes. 19 Section III will survey the legal landscape con-
cerning the NFL and the single entity antitrust issue.20 While also
touching on judicial treatment of the issue, this Comment will focus
on the heated debate between two divergent groups over the single
entity status of the NFL.21 Section IV will provide a summary of the
oral argument that took place before the Supreme Court on Janu-
ary 13, 2010.22 Finally, Section V will conclude by considering both
positions advanced in Section III and argues that the NFL should
be reviewed from a per se approach even though the Court pre-
ferred a rule of reason approach. 23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act24
The Sherman Antitrust Act was adopted by Congress in 1890 to
prohibit illegal trusts and to promote a free-market economy.25
decide. See Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 4 (identifying single entity issue as one
before Supreme Court).
19. For a further discussion of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Supreme Court
precedent, the NFL, and American Needle, see infra notes 24-38 and accompanying
text.
20. For a further discussion of the antitrust issues facing the NFL, see infra
notes 105-220 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the debate over the single entity question as it
applies to the NFL, see infra notes 105-220 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the American Needle oral argument, see infra
notes 222-228 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the ultimate implications of both sides of the
single entity argument, see infra notes 241-267 and accompanying text.
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004) (detailing law against illegal restraints of
trade). Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act states, in relevant part, that, "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce. . . is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Section I]. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states, in relevant
part, that, "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2004) [hereinafter Section II].
25. See The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890), available
at http://voteview.com/antitrst.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (exploring Sher-
man Act adoption to address government's concern over monopolies); Antitrust
Laws and You, http://www.justice.gov/atr/laws.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009)
(noting Sherman Act's "express... national commitment to a free market econ-
omy."); Antitrust: An Overview, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/ wex/antitrust (last
visited Nov. 21, 2009) ("Because of fears during the late 1800s that monopolies
dominated America's free market economy, Congress passed the Sherman Anti-
trust Act in 1890 to combat anticompetitive practices, reduce market domination
[Vol. 17: p. 529
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Section I of the Sherman Act "ban [s] business arrangements in re-
straint of trade."2 6 Section II of the Sherman Act "prohibit[s] at-
tempts to monopolize."27 Generally, the Sherman Act is meant to
"combat anticompetitive practices, reduce market domination by
individual corporations, and preserve unfettered competition as the
rule of trade."28 Consequently, the Sherman Act is the foundation
and the basis for most federal antitrust actions.29 These actions can
be adjudicated following either the "rule of reason" approach or
the per se rule approach.3
0
Some commentators have labeled the statute as vague and
overly ambiguous as to exactly what sort of concerted action is ille-
gal.3 1 According to one commentator, the confusion over the Sher-
man Act's application seems to stem from the distinction courts
must draw between legitimate unilateral business conduct and un-
by individual corporations, and preserve unfettered competition as the rule of
trade.").
26. Robert L. Bradley, Jr., On the Origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act, CATO
JouRNAL, Winter 1990, at 737.
27. Id.
28. Antitrust: An Overview, supra note 25. It is generally agreed that Congress
enacted the Sherman Act because of fears during the late 1800s that monopolies
would come to dominate the American free market economy. See id. (providing
overview of Sherman Act); See also Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a
Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422, 423 (1965) (noting Sena-
tor John Sherman's definition of evils to be met by impending antitrust
legislation).
29. See Antitrust: An Overview, supra note 25 (describing background and use
of Sherman Act).
30. See id. ("Violations under the Sherman Act take one of two forms - either
as a per se violation or as a violation of the rule of reason."). Under the Sherman
Act, a per se violation is one that is so anticompetitive that it does not require the
court to look into whether the effects of the practice cause an unreasonable re-
straint of trade. See id. ("A per se violation requires no further inquiry into the
practice's actual effect on the market or the intentions of those individuals who
engaged in the practice."). Id. Still, "Some business practices...at times constitute
anticompetitive behavior and at other times encourage competition within the
market." Id. For these cases the court applies the rule of reason, which is "a total-
ity of the circumstances test [that] asks whether the challenged practice promotes
or suppresses market competition." Id.
31. See Bradley, supra note 26, at 738 (noting exact origins and intent of Sher-
man Act have baffled scholars for years); Sherman Anti-Trust Act, http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/documents/docpages/document-page5l.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 14, 2009) ("The Sherman Act was designed to restore competition but
was loosely worded and failed to define such critical terms as 'trust,' 'combination,'
'conspiracy,' and 'monopoly.'").
2010]
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lawful concerted activity. 32 The policy objectives behind the Sher-
man Act are equally as unclear.33
Despite this confusion, courts have discerned the "critical
threshold issues" in terms of antitrust law. 34 First, courts must de-
termine the single entity issue: whether or not the entities alleged
to have illegally conspired in violation of the Sherman Act are in
fact separate entities. 35 If the action in question was committed by
a single entity, the action will be per se dismissed because the Sher-
man Act only reaches conduct that involves a plurality of actors.
36
Second, if the court finds that multiple entities are involved, a "rule
of reason" analysis must be conducted.3 7 When conducting a rule
32. See Daniel Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Re-Examining the
Threshold Questions, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953, 955 (1988) [hereinafter Lazaroff ASU
Article] (discussing application of Sherman Act to professional sports leagues).
Professor Lazaroff states that, "The Courts have properly recognized that unilateral
business conduct must be distinguished from concerted activity because the for-
mer is not covered by [Section I], while the latter is clearly reached by the statute."
Id. He notes, however, that this distinction is sometimes a difficult one to draw.
See id. at 956-57 (presenting questions that arise when applying Sherman Act to
professional sports leagues).
33. See Blake, supra note 28, at 422-23 (portraying ongoing debate over Sher-
man Act's policy objectives); Bradley, supra note 26, at 738 (questioning textbook
view of legislative intent behind Sherman Act); see also Myron C. Grauer, Recogni-
tion of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act:
Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Grauer Michigan Article] ("Scholars generally agree that the legislative history
of the Sherman Act is so vague that no single underlying enforcement policy can
be derived from it and that several possible enforcement policies can be found in
the congressional debates leading to its enactment.").
34. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 953 (introducing issues which
courts must decide in order to resolve antitrust claims). Lazaroff also notes that
"most courts have properly recognized that unilateral business conduct must be
distinguished from concerted activity because the former is not covered by [Sec-
tion I]." Id. at 955.
35. See id. at 953 (explaining initial question in antitrust analysis). Lazaroff
explains, "First, courts must determine whether [Section I] of the Sherman Act
even applies to a particular practice or whether there is an absence of the con-
certed action necessary to invoke [Section I] on the theory that [the entities in-
volved are actually] a single entity." Id.
36. See id. (noting end of antitrust analysis if court finds only single entity was
involved in conduct); see also Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 5 (explain-
ing antitrust action dismissal at summaryjudgment stage if plurality of actors is not
found).
37. See LazaroffASU Article, supra note 32, at 953 (identifying second issue in
antitrust analysis). Lazaroff explains that, "Second, assuming that the courts reject
single entity status. . .and conclude that [the entities in question] are separate
actors for [Section I] purposes, important questions [involving the rule of reason]
are raised." Id. The Supreme Court has proclaimed that rule of reason analysis is
not to be conducted if the action is found to be per se illegal, which only occurs if
the action is "manifestly anticompetitive." See Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S.
36, 49-50 (1977) ("Cont'l T.V.") (analyzing per se versus rule of reason antitrust
analysis). The Court defined the "rule of reason" standard of analysis as one in
6
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of reason analysis, the court is looking for unreasonable restraints
on competition.3 8 Additionally, the question of market definition
plays an important role in this analysis.3 9
B. The Copperweld Decision 40
The most recent and relevant Supreme Court decision con-
cerning Section I was issued in 1984, when the Court decided COp-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.41 In that case, petitioner
Copperweld Corp. purchased petitioner Regal Tube Co. from Lear
Siegler, Inc. 42 Under the conditions of the sale, Lear was prohib-
ited from competing with Regal for five years. 43 Meanwhile, an of-
ficer at Lear Siegler formed respondent Independence Tube
Corp.44 Even though the officer knew of the non-compete agree-
ment, Independence Tube began to compete in the steel tubing
which "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether
a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint
on competition." Id. at 49.
38. See Cont'l T.V, 433 U.S. at 49-50 (explaining rule of reason analysis).
39. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 953 (establishing properly de-
fined relevant markets as essential to rule of reason analysis). As the Supreme
Court noted, however, the question of market definition is just one question in a
totality of circumstances analysis. See Cont'l T.V, 433 U.S. at 49 (noting what must
be considered to decide whether practice imposes unreasonable restraint on
competition).
40. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777
(1984).
41. See id. (holding that parent corporation and wholly owned subsidiary have
complete unity of interest and cannot illegally conspire with each other in viola-
tion of federal antitrust law). Copperweld is the most recent and relevant antitrust
precedent applicable in the professional sports league context. See, e.g., Gary Rob-
erts, The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited, 64. TUL. L. REV. 117, 126 (1989)
[hereinafter Roberts '89 Tulane Article] (resolving issue of single entity status of
sports league by using Copperweld as authority). It is also the case that is used as
authority by commentators debating the single entity status of sports leagues. See,
e.g., Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 755-56 (basing argument and counterargu-
ment of professional sports league single entity status on interpretation of Cop-
perweld). At oral argument, one speaker referenced a more recent case. See
generally Oral Argument, supra note 9 (discussing Supreme Court precedent). The
Court has considered the application of the Sherman Act to a joint venture be-
tween oil companies to market gasoline to gas stations. See Dagher v. Texaco, 547
U.S. 1 (2006). The Court unanimously found that there was no violation of the
Sherman Act because the joint venture acted as a single entity when making pric-
ing decisions. See id.
42. See Coppenveld, 467 U.S. at 756 (discussing facts of case).
43. See id. (describing terms of sale agreement).
44. See id. (detailing formation of Independence Tube Corp.). The officer in
question was also a former officer of Regal and thus had extensive knowledge of
industry operations and the companies involved in the dispute. See id. (consider-
ing background of former Regal office).
2010] 535
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industry.45 After learning of this, Copperweld and Regal proceeded
to send threatening letters to would-be suppliers of Independence
Tube.4
6
Independence Tube retaliated by filing suit in federal court,
alleging that Copperweld and Regal conspired against it in violation
of Section 1. 4 7 The Supreme Court held that concerted action be-
tween a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary was
outside the scope of the Sherman Act because it was not really the
conduct of two separate entities. 48 In so holding, the Court estab-
lished that concerted action between a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary is per se legal in terms of Section .49
Weighing heavily on the Court's decision was the notion that a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are not truly separate enti-
ties for antitrust purposes because they do not have truly separate
interests. 50 The Court's express language, which has later gener-
ated much confusion, was that "a parent and its wholly owned sub-
45. See id. (describing Independence Tube's initiation of operations). The
officer began by looking for financing and for companies to supply Independence
Tube in an effort to establish competition with Lear and Copperweld. See id. (not-
ing Independence Tube's search for financing and supply).
46. See id. at 756-57 (detailing Copperweld's retaliatory actions). These letters
referenced the non-compete agreement signed during the purchase of Regal. See
id. (describing content of retaliatory letters). The letters threatened legal action
against any company that violated the agreement by supplying Independence
Tube so that it could compete with Copperweld and Regal. See id. at 757 (noting
letters' threat of legal action).
47. See id. at 757 (detailing initiation of suit). Ajury found that Copperweld
and Regal had conspired together and thus had violated Section I. See id. at 758
(noting trial court outcome). The Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling, finding
that Supreme Court precedent on the issue allowed for subjecting an intra-enter-
prise conspiracy to Section I scrutiny. See id. (noting circuit court outcome).
48. See id. at 777 (describing holding of Supreme Court). The Court found
that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary "are incapable of conspiring with
each other for purposes of [Section I]." Id.
49. See id. at 778 (detailing rule laid down by Court). The language of the
opinion proclaimed that, "Today the Court announces a new per se rule: a wholly
owned subsidiary is incapable of conspiring with its parent under of the Sherman
Act." Id. As a per se legal activity, concerted action between a parent and a wholly
owned subsidiary requires no rule of reason analysis. See id. (noting disposal of
rule of reason analysis for per se rules).
50. See id. at 771 ("[Action between a parent company and its wholly owned
subsidiary] does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of
economic power previously pursuing separate interests."). This distinction is fun-
damental in coming to the conclusion that the plurality of actors required for
antitrust scrutiny is not present between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary,
even though the two companies are technically separate. See id. (declaring that a
contrary rule "would serve no useful antitrust purpose but could well deprive con-
sumers of the efficiencies that decentralized management may bring.").
[Vol. 17: p. 529
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sidiary have a complete unity of interest."51 Noteworthy also is the
Court's restriction of its holding; the Court made sure to "limit [its]
inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in viola-
tion of [Section I]."52
C. The NFL53
The global giant that is now the NFL came from humble begin-
nings.54 In 1920, team owners met in Canton, Ohio, and informally
agreed to play a common schedule and name a champion at the
end of each season of play. 55 As team profitability became more
viable, the league continued to expand in size and reach.56 In
1959, the rival American Football League ("AFL") was formed to
capitalize on the growing popularity of the sport.57 The two leagues
subsequently announced a merger, which was finalized in 1970.58
The league thus had twenty-six teams, and has since added six more
to arrive at a league of thirty-two. 59
51. Id. The court attempted to clarify this assertion by explaining why a par-
ent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. See id.
("[The objectives of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary] are common, not
disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two
separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team
of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver.").
52. Id. at 767. The Court also left open another issue, when it stated that,
"We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for
conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own." Id.
53. See generally Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League
(2006 Rev.), http://static.nfl.com/static/content//public/static/html/careers/
pdf/co_.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2009) (outlining rules, bylaws, operating
procedures, schedule, and player conduct guidelines of NFL).
54. See NFL History, http://www.nfl.com/history (last visited Jan. 24, 2010)
(outlining history of NFL).
55. See id. (describing beginnings of NFL).
56. See id. (describing growth of NFL).
57. See id. (noting formation of AFL). The AFL was highly successful in its
first decade, competing directly with the more established NFL. See id. (noting
beginnings of AFL).
58. See id. (examining merger of AFL and NFL). As counsel for the NFL
noted in his oral argument before the Supreme Court, the merger between the
AFL and the NFL "would have been subject to Section I challenge because it in-
volved venture formation, but an act of Congress said that that wasn't necessary."
Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 41.
59. See NFL History, supra note 54 (exploring NFL's post merger structure).
Three teams from the original NFL joined the thirteen AFL teams to form the
NFL's American Football Conference. See id. (detailing AFC formation). The re-
maining sixteen NFL teams thus comprised the NFL's National Football Confer-
ence. See id. (detailing NFC formation). The six "expansion" teams have been
added over the years to further broaden the NFL's reach. See Oral Argument,
supra note 9, at 41 ("The venture has expanded its production capability by adding
new teams.").
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Currently, the NFL is the governing body that oversees the ath-
letic competition between the thirty-two professional football
teams.60 The league is organized into two conferences - the Ameri-
can Football Conference ("AFC") and the National Football Con-
ference ("NFC") - with sixteen teams per conference divided up
into four divisions. 61 The teams compete in four preseason games
and sixteen regular season games.62 The best six teams from each
conference make the playoffs, with the winner of the AFC facing
the winner of the NFC in the Super Bowl game to determine the
league champion.63
The NFL as a business is tremendously popular, and such pop-
ularity is dwarfed only by its profitability. 64 The league, however, is
different from traditional profit seeking business organizations. 65
The structure and operation of the league presents a paradox such
that labeling the league as one entity or many becomes a signifi-
60. See In a League of Its Own, supra note 3 (defining NFL structure and detail-
ing financial success); Len Pasquarelli, Sen. Spector Taking Aim at NFL Antitrust Ex-
emption, ESPN.coM, Dec. 7, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=2690 171 (detailing league in context of media broadcast antitrust
exemption).
61. See National Football League Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.nfl.com/help/faq (last visited Sept. 20, 2009) (explaining league operations).
The American Football Conference consists of the Baltimore Ravens, the Buffalo
Bills, the Cincinnati Bengals, the Cleveland Browns, the Denver Broncos, the
Houston Texans, the Indianapolis Colts, the Jacksonville Jaguars, the Kansas City
Chiefs, the Miami Dolphins, the New England Patriots, the New YorkJets, the Oak-
land Raiders, the Pittsburgh Steelers, the San Diego Chargers, and the Tennessee
Titans. See id. (outlining AFC structure). The National Football Conference con-
sists of the Arizona Cardinals, the Atlanta Falcons, the Carolina Panthers, the Chi-
cago Bears, the Dallas Cowboys, the Detroit Lions, the Green Bay Packers, the
Minnesota Vikings, the New Orleans Saints, the New York Giants, the Philadelphia
Eagles, the St. Louis Rams, the San Francisco 49ers, the Seattle Seahawks, the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and the Washington Redskins. See id. (outlining NFC
structure).
62. See id. (detailing NFL schedule). Typically, games are held every week on
either Sunday or Monday, unless the team has a bye week and is not scheduled to
play. See id. (explaining team playing schedule and off weeks).
63. See id. (explaining playoff structure and participation). The winner of
each of the four divisions within each conference automatically makes the playoffs.
See id. (noting that division winners automatically make playoffs). Also, the next
two best teams, records wise, in each conference, make the playoffs as "wild cards."
See id. (explaining wild card playoff selection).
64. For a further discussion of the popularity and profitability of the NFL, see
supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
65. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 238-54 (explaining how NFL
does not resemble cartels, trade associations, joint ventures, commonly owned
groups of separate firms, or partnerships); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33,
at 25 (noting courts' cautious approach to professional sports leagues because of
unique organizational makeup).
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cantly difficult task.66 On the one hand, each NFL team is sepa-
rately owned and internally selects its own legal form.6 7 On the
other hand, the league negotiates its television broadcast contracts
as a single entity as opposed to each team negotiating its own
broadcast contracts for its own games. 68
Further, each team is "required to negotiate independently its
home stadium lease, its players' salaries, and its other expenses." 69
And yet, certain revenues are pooled by the league and divided up
amongst the teams. 70 As one commentator noted, "Virtually every
court to discuss the issue, [has found] that sports league manage-
ment 'does indeed present unique and difficult problems for the
antitrust observer. "' 71
D. American Needle
American Needle revisits the debate concerning antitrust applica-
tion to professional sports leagues.72 American Needle is an ap-
parel manufacturer with a long-standing business relationship with
66. See In a League of Its Own, supra note 3 ("A sports league is an awkward
endeavor, since the owners must co-operate on many business decisions despite
fielding teams that compete fiercely."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 301
("Most courts that have addressed sports league issues within the context of Sec-
tion I have observed that leagues constitute unusual business organizations and
involve unusual relationships."); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 758-60 (detail-
ingjudicial confusion over single entity status of NFL).
67. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 261 (discussing organizational
aspects of NFL teams); See also Sarah Adams, Sports League Economic Structure
and Fiscal Focus, http://www.sportsbusinesssims.com/sports.league.economic.
structure.fiscal.focus.sarah.adams.htm (detailing league structure and economic
vitality).
68. See In a League of Its Own, supra note 3 (noting league broadcast contracts
entered into on behalf of league as single entity); Roberts UCLA Article, supra
note 8, at 262 (describing league policy of negotiating television broadcast con-
tracts); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 27 (notingjudicial consideration
of league negotiated broadcast licenses).
69. Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 261. Professor Goldman also notes
that teams report separate profits and losses that come via its cumulative income
generating activities - i.e., both from the league and on its own. See Goldman
Article, supra note 14, at 260 (noting judicial considerations given in NFL team
status determination).
70. See In a League of its Own, supra note 3 (explaining that teams share
roughly 70% of their revenues with each other). As such, "One team's losing sea-
son and sagging revenues are offset by another team's banner year." Id.
71. Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL. L. REv. 562, 567 (1986) [hereinafter
Roberts '86 Tulane Article] (arguing for per se characterization of sports leagues
as single entities for antitrust purposes).
72. See Munson, supra note 8 (describing American Needle going to Supreme
Court and possible impact on antitrust law decision would have).
2010] 539
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the NFL. 73 As an NFL vendor, American Needle held a headwear
license for over twenty years.74 American Needle lost this contract
in 2001 when the teams authorized NFL Properties to grant an ex-
clusive apparel contract to Reebok for ten years. 75 Soon thereafter,
American Needle filed suit against the NFL, alleging the exclusive
contract granted to Reebok violated Section I.76
At the outset, the Seventh Circuit conceded that American
Needle's claim led the court into "murky waters."7 7 This murkiness
was brought on because "[Courts] have yet to render a definitive
opinion as to whether the teams of a professional sports league can
be considered a single entity in light of [Copperweld]."78 Further
complicating the issue was the lack of scholarly opinion and legisla-
tive commentary on the subject. 79 Nevertheless, the Seventh Cir-
cuit began by defining the NFL as "an unincorporated association
of.. . 32 separately owned and operated football teams."80 To pro-
73. See American Needle, 538 F.3d at 738.
74. See id. In 1963, in order to promote the league brand, the NFL teams
formed NFL Properties. See id. at 737. This separate corporate entity was charged
with "developing, licensing, and marketing the intellectual property the teams
owned, such as their logos, trademarks, and other indicia." Id. Consequently, NFL
Properties had the exclusive authority to grant licenses to vendors so that the ven-
dors could use the teams' intellectual property. See id.
75. See id. at 738. American Needle was not the only vendor not to have its
license renewed. See id.
76. See id. American Needle took the position that, "Because each of the indi-
vidual teams separately owned their team logos and trademarks, their collective
agreement to authorize NFL Properties to award the exclusive headwear license
[pertaining to all NFL logos] to Reebok was, in fact, a conspiracy to restrict other
vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the teams' intellectual property." Id. In a
related claim, American Needle argued that "By authorizing NFL Properties to
award the license to Reebok, the NFL teams monopolized the NFL team licensing
and product wholesale markets in violation of Section 2." Id.
77. See id. at 741 ("American Needle argues that the district court incorrectly
concluded that the NFL teams constitute a single entity under [Copperweld] when
collectively licensing their intellectual property. American Needle's argument
leads us into murky waters.").
78. Id. The court then extrapolated on the confusion caused by this issue by
stating that, "The characteristics that sports leagues generally exhibit make the
determination [of single entity status] difficult; in some contexts, a league seems
more aptly described as a single entity immune from antitrust scrutiny, while in
others a league appears to be ajoint venture between independently owned teams
that is subject to review under [Section I]." Id.
79. See id. at 742 (expressing "skepticism that [Copperweld] could provide the
definitive single-entity determination for all sports leagues alike."). Moreover, the
court noted that the "question of whether a professional sports league is a single
entity should be addressed not only "one league at a time," but also "one facet of a
league at a time." Id.
80. Id. at 737. These football teams, the court noted, "Collectively produce an
annual series (or 'season') of over 250 interrelated football games. Each season
culminates in a championship game-a game better known as the Super Bowl." Id.
[Vol. 17: p. 529
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duce their product - NFL Football - the teams "require extensive
coordination and integration. '8 1 Along the same line, the court
found that NFL teams have a unity of interest.8 2
The court ultimately concluded that NFL teams cooperate and
act as one entity.8 3 Weighing heavily on the court's reasoning was
the idea that teams, collectively, are a single source of economic
power.84 Further, the teams need to cooperate in order to produce
their product and compete in the entertainment market.8 5 As
such, the Seventh Circuit concluded that NFL teams act as one en-
tity because they are effectively incapable of conspiring with each
other to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.8 6 The court
thus rejected American Needle's Section I claim and affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NFL.87
American Needle, now in the hands of the Supreme Court, has
garnered much attention in the media from both sports and judi-
cial commentators.88 One writer notes, "Experts agree that the case
... could easily be the most significant legal turning point in the
history of American sports."8 9 A ruling in either direction will have
major ramifications throughout the sporting and business worlds,
especially considering the multitude of industries that are finan-
81. Id. The court stated, "NFL football is produced only when two teams play
a football game. Thus, although each team is a separate corporate entity... no
team can produce a game-the product of NFL football-by itself, much less a full
season of games or the Super Bowl." Id.
82. See id. at 743. The court also noted that, "Though the several NFL teams
could have competing interests regarding the use of their intellectual property
that could conceivably rise to the level of potential intra-league competition, those
interests do not necessarily keep the teams from functioning as a single entity." Id.
83. See id. at 744. The court saw it fit to characterize the league as one entity,
with the teams being different departments of the same business organization. See
id. (noting antitrust law's encouragement of cooperation within organization).
84. See id. The Seventh Circuit proclaimed that, "Since 1963, the NFL teams
have acted as one source of economic power-under the auspices of NFL Properties-
to license their intellectual property collectively and to promote NFL football." Id.
85. See id. at 743 (discussing necessity of cooperation in order to produce
product). The court also pointed to the fact that the teams must jointly produce
the product so as to compete with others in the entertainment market, which af-
fects all of their interests. See id.
86. See id. at 744 (relating Seventh Circuit's holding).
87. See id. (rejecting American Needle's antitrust claim against NFL).
88. See, e.g., Munson, supra note 8 (describing background of American Needle
in preparation for Supreme Court Review); Fletcher, supra note 18 (listing Ameri-
can Needle as one of most important cases going to Supreme Court in October 2009
term).
89. Munson, supra note 8. Munson also quotes an anonymous NFL official as
stating that, "[This] is the first time the league has approached 'so important an
issue at so high a level.'" Id.
2010]
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cially linked to professional sports.90 Ultimately, much is riding on
the Supreme Court's decision in American Needle.9 1
III. ANALYSIS
A. Issue Presented
The issue presented by American Needle, the correct application
of Section I to the NFL and sports leagues in general, has been a
hot topic of judicial and scholarly debate.9 2 This debate has gone
on for years and it is abundantly clear that the single entity status of
sports leagues is an issue that is ripe for Supreme Court review.93
90. See Munson, supra note 8 (discussing effect of American Needle holding).
Munson notes that, "If the NFL manages to persuade the Supreme Court that the
league is a single entity competing with other providers of entertainment rather
than a group of 32 separate businesses competing with each other, the landscape
of the sports industry will be transformed." Id. Conversely, if the Court finds
against the NFL, the league would be opened up to even more, possibly frivolous,
antitrust litigation. See id. (exploring effects of ruling for American Needle). The
other major professional sports leagues would also be immensely affected. See
Fletcher, supra note 18 ("Other sporting leagues are watching the American Needle
case closely.").
91. See Munson, supra note 8 (listing groups, businesses, and industries stand-
ing to be affected by American Needle); Fletcher, supra note 18 ("The answer to this
question has repercussions beyond the production of licensed merchandise.").
92. See Myron C. Grauer, The Use and Misuse of the Term "Consumer Welfare"
Once More to the Mat on the Issue of Single Entity Status for Sports Leagues Under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 64 TUL. L. REv. 71, 72 (1989) [hereinafter Grauer Tulane Arti-
cle] (portraying debate over single entity status of professional sports leagues). As
such, this comment's analysis of the single entity status of sports leagues is cen-
tered around the debate engaged by two competing factions. See id. (establishing
debate between Pro-NFL and Pro-American Needle sides); Roberts '89 Tulane Ar-
ticle, supra note 41, at 117-19 (framing debate issue and points of disagreement);
Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 762-89 (arguing directly with opposing faction).
93. See Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593,
600 (7th Cir. 1996) (" [Circuit Court decisions] do not yield a clear principle about
the proper characterization of sports leagues-and we do not think that [ Copperweld]
imposes one 'right' characterization."); Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 953
("The evolution of legal doctrine in [antitrust] case law does not reveal a pattern
of consistency or provide a model of clarity."); American Needle, 538 F.3d at 741
("We have yet to render a definitive opinion as to whether the teams of a profes-
sional sports league can be considered a single entity in light of [Copperweld]. The
characteristics that sports leagues generally exhibit make the determination diffi-
cult; in some contexts, a league seems more aptly described as a single entity im-
mune from antitrust scrutiny, while in others a league appears to be ajoint venture
between independently owned teams that is subject to review under [Section I].");
Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 271 (noting "The uncertainty created by the
haphazard and confusing decisions that have been rendered both for and against
the leagues," as well as "The confusion over the appropriate standards" for review-
ing sports leagues in antitrust context).
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American Needle is the case that will serve as the vehicle for the Su-
preme Court's review and ultimate resolution of this issue. 94
American Needle frames the issue as whether or not the NFL and
its teams violated antitrust law when the teams collectively agreed to
grant Reebok an exclusive apparel contract.95 The consensus at the
Supreme Court oral argument was that the issue concerned the plu-
rality of actors required by Section I, or lack thereof, in the profes-
sional sports league setting.96 A related issue centers on whether
league activity should be described as concerted or unilateral.9 7
From a broader perspective, the issue is whether or not professional
sports leagues will be immune from Section I - that is, whether an
antitrust suit against a sports league should be dismissed at the
pleadings stage because the action is that of a single entity.98
To be sure, however, the main issue presented to the Supreme
Court is whether the NFL and its member teams constitute one en-
tity for antitrust purposes and are thus immune from Section I scru-
tiny.9 9 American Needle contends the NFL is not a single entity
and that its conduct constitutes concerted activity between a plural-
ity of actors in violation of Section 1.100 American Needle grounds
its argument largely on precedent and the separate ownership of
the NFL teams.1 0 ' Conversely, the NFL contends that it is indeed a
94. For a further discussion of American Needle, see supra notes 72-91 and ac-
companying text.
95. See American Needle, 538 F.3d at 740 (addressing issues presented on
appeal).
96. See Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 4-5 (identifying issues presented by
American Needle).
97. See id. (commenting on related issue). Chief Justice John Roberts articu-
lated this issue as "Whether [the teams' authorization of NFL Properties to grant
an exclusive apparel license to Reebok] are horizontal agreements between the
teams or whether they are a single entity's articulation of the rules." Id. at 11.
98. See id. at 56 (noting larger issue at play in case). Justice Ginsburg noted
the importance of resolving this issue because of the exceedingly costly discovery
process that accompanies antitrust litigation. See id. at 21 ("But once you say no
[on the single entity issue], it's got to be a rule of reason analysis, then you have
discovery, which can be costly."). This larger issue is simply another way of asking
whether sports leagues should be subject to rule of reason analysis or be the bene-
ficiaries of a per se rule of legality. See id. (reframing issue in terms of standard of
analysis to be applied).
99. For a further discussion of the specific issue presented to the Supreme
Court by American Needle, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
100. See Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 20 (presenting arguments for Ameri-
can Needle). Necessarily, American Needle ardently emphasizes that league teams
are separately owned entities, which it argues militates in favor of its argument. See
id. at 21 (arguing against NFL as single entity).
101. See id. at 12 (supporting American Needle's arguments). Glenn D.
Nager, counsel for American Needle, summed up his client's position by stating
that:
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single entity - ajoint venture of thirty-two teams, but a single organ-
ization nonetheless. 10 2 The NFL maintains that its decisions are the
lawful decisions of a lawful venture, and that they are aimed at pro-
moting the organization's product.10 3 The Supreme Court is ex-
pected to rule on this important issue in July 2010.104
B. The NFL and its Teams Constitute a Single Entity
"The Pro-NFL argument" takes the position that the NFL and
its member teams are one entity.10 5 The crux of this argument is
that, although they are separately owned, NFL teams work together
to promote one product.10 6 It follows that, the league product -
"[NFL] teams are separately owned. They are separate decision-makers
joining together, and they are making a decision about how they are go-
ing to jointly produce something or not produce something. And that's
what makes it concerted activity under this Court's consistent teachings.
The distinction between unilateral activity under Section I and concerted
activity under Section I has consistently been [based on collective owner-
ship of assets]."
Id.
102. See id. at 38 (characterizing NFL as joint venture organization).
103. See id. at 39 (establishing basis for NFL Argument). Gregg H. Levy,
counsel for the NFL, summed up his client's position by stating that:
"[The] decisions by the venture about the venture's product are unilat-
eral venture decisions, unilateral venture actions. They are not concerted
actions of the venture's members .... The purpose of the licensing [ac-
tion at issue] is to promote the product. It's to promote the game. And
the NFL member clubs are not independent sources of economic power
in generating that game."
Id. at 3944.
104. SeeJess Bravin, Justices Look Tough in NFL Antitrust Case, THE WALL STREET
JouRNAL, January 14, 2010, at B4 (discussing expected issuance of opinion in Amer-
ican Needle).
105. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 120 (establishing single
entity status of professional sports leagues as leading to league action being ex-
empt from Section I scrutiny); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 260 (pro-
claiming that sports leagues should be regarded as single entities); Roberts '86
Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 567 (finding that professional sports leagues
should be thought of as single economic firms despite having separate ownership);
Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, The Rule of
Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 1015 [hereinaf-
ter Roberts USC Article] (stating that single entity defense is just one way to arrive
at conclusion that internal leagues rules should not be scrutinized under Section
I); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 2 (supporting view that sports
leagues as single entities is consistent with antitrust policy); Grauer Tulane Article,
supra note 92, at 114-15 (concluding that single entity status should be afforded to
sports leagues); John C. Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective
on Competition and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 DuRE L.J. 1013, 1060 [here-
inafter Weistart Article] (advocating for sports league single entity status).
106. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 136 (describing league
product as matrix of interrelated regular season and playoff games that require
cooperation of each team); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 229 ("The
league product also requires complete integration of all the member clubs, none
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NFL football - is thus the product of one entity, which competes
against a plethora of other products in the vast entertainment in-
dustry. 10 7 The Pro-NFL argument maintains that one entity, the
NFL, which produces one product, NFL football, needs the cooper-
ation of all thirty-two of its teams to produce its product.108
The main proponent of the Pro-NFL argument, from a schol-
arly point of view, is Dean Gary R. Roberts of Indiana University
School of Law. 109 Dean Roberts has published numerous articles
on the application of antitrust law to professional sports leagues
and has testified before many courts on the issue.110 The Pro-NFL
of which is by itself able to produce anything."); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra
note 71, at 573 (stating that league cooperation is only way of producing league
entertainment product); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 25 (citing need
for economic cooperation among NFL teams); Weistart Article, supra note 105, at
1017 (suggesting grounds for supporting intraleague cooperation).
107. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 136 (referring to prod-
uct league places in entertainment market); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at
227 (noting that nothing other than NFL as it is can produce entertainment prod-
uct called football); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 573 (stating that
league cooperation is only way of producing league entertainment product); Rob-
erts USC Article, supra note 105, at 1015 (finding that production of league prod-
uct requires cooperation of all teams); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 6
(noting that NFL competes with other entertainment entities in entertainment
market); Grauer Tulane Article, supra note 92, at 102 (noting that unaffiliated
teams could not hope to produce product that would be accepted by consumers in
entertainment market); Weistart Article, supra note 105, at 1024 (explaining how
league product competes with other entertainment products).
108. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 136 (reiterating require-
ment of cooperation to produce league entertainment product); Roberts UCLA
Article, supra note 8, at 227 (proclaiming that current league structure is only way
to produce NFL football); Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 1015 (reiterating
that production of league entertainment product requires cooperation of all
teams); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 6 (listing entertainment com-
petitors of NFL); Grauer Tulane Article, supra note 92, at 102 (explaining how
independent teams could not produce equivalent product).
109. See University of Indiana School of Law Faculty Profiles, http://indy-
law.indiana.edu/people/profile.cfm?Id=313 (last visited Sept. 4, 2009) (profiling
Dean Gary Roberts). Dean Roberts has published numerous articles and book
chapters on antitrust law as it relates to sports and sports leagues, most while he
was a professor of law at Tulane University School of Law. See id. (detailing Rob-
erts' career). Dean Roberts is "a recognized expert in sports law" and has occu-
pied many prestigious posts in this capacity, including president of the Spots
Lawyers Association and chairman of the AALS Sports Law Section. See id. (listing
posts held by Roberts). Even commentators who ardently disagree with Dean Rob-
erts' views recognize him as an expert and the main proponent of the Pro-NFL
argument. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 954 n.4 ("Professor Roberts
has been a prolific and consistently ardent supporter of single entity status for
sports leagues and an active critic of the major judicial decisions in this area.");
Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 762 ("Professor Roberts has been the most ar-
dent supporter of the single entity defense for sports leagues.").
110. See University of Indiana School of Law Faculty Profiles, supra note 108
(listing sample of Roberts' published works).
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side argues two main points: first, that sports leagues, the NFL in
particular, should be considered as single entities in terms of Sec-
tion I.111 Second, because sports leagues should be regarded as sin-
gle entities, the Pro-NFL argument follows that their governance
rules should be thought of as per se legal.1 12
In making its first point, the Pro-NFL side begins by emphasiz-
ing that sports leagues are fundamentally unique business organiza-
tions.113 This is because they exhibit characteristics of many
different business forms.114 Yet, they do not resemble any common
business form in all respects.11 5 Therefore, the unique nature of
the NFL requires special consideration by courts in terms of anti-
trust law application.11 6
In attempting to classify teams within a league, the Pro-NFL
side maintains that a sports team, by itself, is incapable of any pro-
ductive activity. 117 Without any manner of independent economic
111. See, e.g., Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 144 (advocating for
consideration of NFL as single entity). The Pro-NFL argument justifiable resem-
bles the NFL's argument before the Supreme Court in American Needle. See Oral
Argument, supra note 9, at 38-39 (setting forth NFL's single entity argument).
112. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 144 ("[Internal] league
rules should be per se legal under Section I."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra 8, at
239 (noting that courts do not find leagues to be per se illegal cartels but then
contradictorily do not finding their rules to be per se legal); Roberts '86 Tulane
Article, supra note 71, at 582 (explaining that intra-organizational decisions of sin-
gle entities should not be subject to Section I review); Roberts USC Article, supra
note 105, at 950 ("[Lleague practices should be per se lawful when reasonably
related to the operation of the league's joint venture business.").
113. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 120 ("[There are] funda-
mental facts distinguishing a sports league from any other type of business organi-
zation in our economy."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 226 (declaring
that sports league are fundamentally different from any other business enterprise);
Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 585 ("The unique structural and rela-
tional characteristics of a sports league... defy its being analogized to any other
type of business organization."); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 24
(considering unique aspects of professional sports leagues); Wiestart Article, supra
note 104, at 75 (criticizing legal decisions not taking league's unique makeup into
account).
114. See, e.g., Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 4 (analogizing sports
league to law firm).
115. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 239-61 (explaining that
leagues are not cartels, trade associations,joint ventures, commonly owned groups
of separate firms, or partnerships).
116. See 538 F.3d at 742 (struggling to apply antitrust law to NFL because of
"[The] many and conflicting characteristics that professional sports leagues gener-
ally exhibit."); Chicago ProJ'l Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d 593 at 599 (finding character-
ization of sports league for antitrust purposes is tough question because of
contradicting characteristics that sports leagues exhibit).
117. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 120 ("[A] league mem-
ber team does not and cannot lawfully have any relevant independent productive
function."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 227 (finding that individual
sports teams are incapable of independent economic activity); Roberts '86 Tulane
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activity, a team's only avenue for viability is its association with the
league.' 18 Imagine, as Roberts suggests, that there is only one foot-
ball team in existence.' 19 This team would be stagnant and have no
economic purpose because it would need at least one other team
with which to compete against. 120
When adding a second team to the mix, one would consider
the two teams to be "competitors."121 Despite the common aca-
demic understanding of economic competitors, Roberts asserts that
NFL teams are not economic competitors in the way contemplated
by antitrust law. 122 To support this point, Roberts contends that
competition is not synonymous with rivalry. 123 Supportive is the
work of Robert Bork, who argued that, "The antitrust proscription
against actions injurious to competition should not be read to out-
law every integrative or cooperative effort." 124
Article, supra note 71, at 564 (dismissing argument that member clubs are inde-
pendent economic firms); Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 985 ("An indi-
vidual member club in a league is incapable of independent production."); Grauer
Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 16 (agreeing with court's finding that NFL
teams can productively operate individually); Grauer Tulane Article, supra note 92,
at 89 (noting that sports teams cannot produce anything alone).
118. See, e.g. Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 120-21 (maintaining
teams are not productive without league association); Grauer Tulane Article, supra
note 92, at 89 (arguing that joint production does not imply Section I liability
where joint production is necessary and only form of production).
119. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 227 (providing example single
team example to show that NFL teams are incapable of independent economic
activity).
120. See Id. (arguing that football team, by itself, has no profit potential be-
cause it is incapable of creating revenue without other teams). But see Lazaroff
ASU Article, supra note 32, at 960 (arguing that individual teams do have eco-
nomic purpose, absent league structure, because they can perform for profit either
against themselves or against others without presence of league).
121. See Weistart, supra note 105, at 1018-19 (noting how teams in league only
compete on field); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 234 (stating that league
teams compete athletically).
122. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 231 (proclaiming that league
teams cannot be natural economic competitors); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra
note 71, at 575 (arguing that NFL teams are not horizontal competitors in antitrust
sense); Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 989 ("It is counterintuitive to oper-
ate on the premise that each member club is an independent economic competi-
tor of, and required to compete with, the other clubs"); see also Grauer Michigan
Article, supra note 33, at 25 (supporting court findings that NFL teams are not
typical economic competitors); Weistart Article, supra note 105, at 1028 (sug-
gesting NFL teams are not natural economic competitors).
123. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 232 (rejecting any definition
of competition that equates it to rivalry). Dean Roberts distinguishes the fact that
member teams of a league are "Vigorous athletic competitors" from the fact that
"In no meaningful way.. are the clubs natural economic competitors." Id. at 231.
124. Id. at 232. Robert Bork served as the Solicitor General of the United
States from 1973-1977. See Robert H. Bork Biography, http://www.hudson.org/
leam/index.cfm?fuseaction=staffbio&eid=BorkRob (last visited Oct. 2, 2009)
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Having established that league teams do not compete with one
another economically, the Pro-NFL side next turns to the coopera-
tion between teams that is necessary to produce the league prod-
uct.125 Roberts explains that the cooperation between league clubs
is both necessary and legal. 126 He analogizes sports leagues to legal
partnerships, whose decisions are not scrutinized under Section I,
because they reflect the collective judgment of the various members
of a single entity.127 In arguing for single entity status, Roberts' ulti-
mate selling point is that the league product, NFL Football, cannot
be produced without the full cooperation of its member teams. 128
Implicit in this conclusion is the assertion that the league as a whole
(chronicling career of Robert Bork). He was also the acting Attorney General of
the United States from 1973-1974, and served on the D.C. Circuit from 1982-1988.
See id. (listing achievements of Robert Bork).
125. For a further discussion of necessary league and team cooperation, see
supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
126. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 120 ("The product of a
league cannot be produced by any one member team, but rather is only produced
by the complete integration and cooperation of each and every member of the
league"); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 229 (explaining that league prod-
uct, NFL football, requires complete integration of all member clubs); Roberts '86
Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 589 ("The common purpose and source of eco-
nomic power in a sports league derive from the inherently co-productive and
wholly integrated nature of the league."); Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at
1013 (noting that long run league efficiency depends on full cooperation of mem-
ber teams); see also Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 25-26 (tracing evi-
dence of need for economic competition among NFL teams); Grauer Tulane
Article, supra note 92, at 84 (exploring competitive versus anticompetitive coopera-
tion); Weistart Article, supra note 105, at 1041 (exploring sports team
cooperation).
127. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 294:
[The] form of governance [used by the NFL] is quite similar to that used
by partnerships .... In a partnership, major decisions are made by vote
of the partners, who act as a governing board of the whole . . . . In ...
partnership ... corporate organizations, the governing body is comprised
of individuals whose mission is to manage the firm yet whose actual con-
stituency is only one segment of the ownership of the firm. The same is
true of the governing board of a sports league, whose members have been
held to have the same fiduciary duty to the league as members of any
corporate board.
128. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 136 ("Every dimension of
the production and marketing of every game must be expressly or tacitly agreed
upon by every team in the league."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra 8, at 229 ("The
league product also requires complete integration of all the member clubs."); Rob-
erts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 590 ("The league product is indivisible,
with no part attributable solely to the efforts of a single member club."); Roberts
USC Article, supra note 105, at 986-87 ("Only when all of the joint producers agree
to some method for determining where, when, between whom, and how every
league game is produced can there be a league schedule and a valuable integrated
league product."); see also Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 23 (noting
that only total cooperation can produce NFL product); Grauer Tulane Article,
supra note 92, at 92 (discussing league product as function of team cooperation).
[Vol. 17: p. 529
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss2/9
HUDDLE UP: AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL
is the lowest economic entity capable of producing the league prod-
uct.129 As such, league decisions should not be subject to Section I
scrutiny because they are the internal decisions of a single entity -
the only entity capable of making those decisions in order to pro-
duce its product. 130
Further, the Pro-NFL side reads Copperweld and its progeny to
work in favor of its single entity argument.131 Roberts argues that
the Copperweld holding promotes analyzing the economic realities
of a situation overjust the form.13 2 Such a reading would effectively
negate the Pro-American Needle side's contention that NFL teams
are separate entities because they are separately owned.1 33 Simi-
larly, Professor Weistart maintains that language in Copperweld cap-
129. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 229 ("The league is the lowest
indivisible economic unit capable of producing the league entertainment prod-
uct."); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 573 (stating that league is low-
est form of organization capable of producing league product).
130. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 119 ("Purely internal
league rules or decisions that merely define the product that the league joint ven-
ture will produce, designate who will produce it, and outline when, where, and
how it will be produced are merely the normal business decisions of the only eco-
nomic entity capable of making those production decisions and as such ought to
be beyond the reach of Section I."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 247
("[The NFL] should be regarded as a single business firm whose internal manage-
ment decisions lack the necessary plurality of actors to implicate Section I.");
Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 33 ("The internal restraints and agree-
ments made by the League are designed to promote efficiencies in attaining this
end. They are only ancillary to the main purpose of producing a more marketable
product. Viewed in this manner, these restraints should not be subject to successful
challenge under the Sherman Act.").
131. See, e.g., Grauer Tulane Article, supra note 92, at 107-08 (using Copperweld
to support approach to single entity issue); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note
71, at 588-89 (interpreting Copperweld language to support functional instead of
formal approach to single entity issue).
132. See Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 586 ("The Supreme
Court noted. . .in [Copperweld] that characteristics of an organization which are
merely the result of its voluntary choice in the pursuit of optimal efficiency are not
relevant in determining if the enterprise is a single entity. Rather, the inherent
economic realities of the intra-organizational relationship should govern, for oth-
erwise form would be irrationally elevated over substance."); Roberts '89 Tulane
Article, supra note 41, at 126 (arguing that an antitrust analysis purely based on
formalistic factors like separate ownership was rendered invalid by Copperweld); see
also Grauer Tulane Article, supra note 92, at 103 (discussing formalistic versus eco-
nomic reality approach in light of Copperweld).
133. See Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 586 ("It is erroneous in a
single entity analysis to look to whether member clubs of a league are separately
organized, separately owned, or maintain separate accounting for profit and loss.")
Roberts then goes on to argue that the economic realities of professional sports
leagues warrant concluding that the league and its member teams constitute a
single entity for antitrust purposes. See id. at 589 (concluding that sports leagues
are single firms after economic reality antitrust analysis).
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tures the essence of the NFL and thus legalizes its form. 134 This
language, he argues, works in favor of the Pro-NFL argument.135
After establishing the above argument, Roberts and the Pro-
NFL side proceed to lobby for a per se legality rule for sports
leagues. 136  Citing his earlier analysis, Roberts asserts that the
league is the single, relevant entity for Section I analysis.1 37 League
rules, such as those regulating play location or broadcast restric-
tions, are aimed at "defining the league product."'1 38  Because
league rulings are those of a single entity attempting to manage its
own operations, it follows that no Section I analysis is necessary and
league rules should be per se legal.139
A second reason offered for a per se approach to sports
leagues concerns unnecessary judicial oversight and involve-
134. See Weistart Article, supra note 105, at 1063 (referring to "no sudden
joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests" lan-
guage in Coppenweld).
135. See id. (noting that "there is no 'sudden joining' of interests that previ-
ously were separate" in sports league context). Weistart argues that, because
league constituent clubs were basically born together, there is no sudden joining
of interests, and thus, there are no separate entities to consider. See id. at 1064
(concluding that NFL and its teams are one entity for antitrust purposes).
136. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 126-27 (supporting posi-
tion that league rulings are per se legal); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at
240 (arguing that judicial rejection of per se antitrust approach to sports leagues is
counterproductive); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 577 (finding that
per se approach to sports league antitrust legality is preferable); Roberts USC Arti-
cle, supra note 105, at Section II (presenting case for per se legality of league
decisions).
137. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 118 ("The league, not
the individual club, is the relevant firm for purposes of antitrust analysis.").
138. Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 119 (defining league rules
as those that "define the product that the league. .. will produce, designate who
will produce it, and outline when, where, and how it will be produced."); Roberts
'86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 591 (noting that league rules are those that
regulate internal rivalry of league); Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 975
(suggesting that league rules can pertain to both structure and operations); see also
Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 24 (adding that league rules are neces-
sary to equalize playing ability of various teams); Oral Argument, supra note 9, at
39 (explaining how league decisions are made to promote league product).
139. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 119 (noting that league
rules are "merely the normal business decisions of the only economic entity capa-
ble of making those production decisions and as such ought to be beyond the
reach of Section I."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at Section I1-A (explain-
ing that league rules are meant to regulate inter-enterprise rivalry and are thus
beyond scope of Sherman Act); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at Sec-
tion I-D (arguing that considering league rules as those of single entity does not
make leagues immune from liability because actions can still be challenged under
Section II of Sherman Act); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 35 (analo-
gizing sports league rules to internal law firm rules which are meant to promote
efficiencies and are thus legal); Grauer Tulane Article, supra note 92, at 105 (criti-
cizing approach that allows Section I scrutiny of internal league decisions).
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ment. 1 40 Recall that sports leagues already incur enormous costs
associated with antitrust litigation.1 4 1 Subsequently, not dismissing
a Section I claim against a sports league early on will further bur-
den the league with superfluous litigation costs. 14 2 Additionally, an-
titrust objectives are not accomplished when courts interfere with
the legitimate actions of business entities. 14 3
The third and perhaps most plausible argument advanced by
the Pro-NFL side in support of a per se approach to sports league
antitrust claims is based on the "Consumer Welfare Model."
144
Most, including the Supreme Court, have agreed that consumer
wealth maximization is the primary goal of the Sherman Act.14 5 As
140. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 145 (explaining that not
adopting per se approach will lead to "risk of having misguided or ill-motivated
courts overturn generally efficient league rules."); Roberts UCLA Article, supra
note 8, at 264-65:
As a practical matter,judicial review and regulation of the countless inter-
personal and interdepartmental rivalries existing in any business is impos-
sible. The judicial system simply could not handle the volume of cases
that would arise each time [someone claims that a firm's decision] as to
promotion, profit division, budgeting, plant location, pricing, and com-
pany equipment purchases caused a reduction in some intrafirm rivalry.
See Also Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 582-84 (advocating for preclu-
sion of judicial second-guessing of internal management decisions); Roberts USC
Article, supra note 105, at 989 ("Because member clubs must act jointly to produce
the league product, they should have the same freedom as any other firm to make
internal business decisions without judicial second guessing."); Grauer Michigan
Article, supra note 33, at 9:
Consequently, courts should not interfere with unilateral decisions on
how a business should operate unless the business possesses monopoly
power and the questioned practices are intended to restrict output. Judi-
cial interference with practices that are not aimed at restricting output
and that are therefore attempts to promote efficiency will quite likely in-
terfere with the dynamics of the market place and produce anticompeti-
tive effects.
141. For a further discussion of costs incurred by sports leagues relating to
antitrust suits, see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
142. See Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 269-70 (noting that prospect
of antitrust litigation constitutes major, almost daily, burden on NFL).
143. See id. at Section II (explaining negative effects ofjudicial review of sport
league antitrust cases).
144. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at Section I-A (noting that
consumer welfare must govern analysis of antitrust claims against professional
sports leagues); Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at Section II-A (covering pol-
icy implications of antitrust claims against professional sports leagues); see also
Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at Section I-B (answering question of why
consumer wealth maximization is only proper goal of antitrust policy enforce-
ment); see generally Grauer Tulane Article, supra note 92 (discussing sport leagues
single entity status with specific consideration paid to consumer welfare).
145. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 121:
Supreme Court decisions over the past decade and a half have established
that the Sherman Act is designed almost exclusively to maximize con-
sumer welfare. Even most populist dissenters from this approach, who
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such, identification of an adverse impact on consumer wealth
should be the chief consideration in antitrust analysis.1 46 The inter-
nal league decisions of the NFL are aimed at promoting the league
product, stimulating inter-organizational rivalry, and boosting effi-
ciency, all in an effort to benefit the consumer. 147 Thus, subjecting
sports leagues to superfluous costs stemming from unnecessary an-
titrust litigation would be injurious to consumer wealth because it
would raise the league's costs and otherwise adversely affect the
league's product.1 48 Roberts thus concludes that internal league
rules should be per se legal in terms of antitrust law so as to main-
tain the benefit to the consumer.1 49
believe that social and political goals should also play some role in anti-
trust enforcement, acknowledge that consumer welfare is and should be
the primary goal.
See also Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 579 ("The Sherman Act is
primarily, if not exclusively, a statute designed to maximize consumer welfare.");
Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 984-85 ("Some scholars maintain that there
are social and political goals which should play a role in antitrust enforcement
policy, but even these dissenters recognize that the economic interests of the con-
sumer should be the primary goal."); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 14
("Only a consumer wealth maximization policy can give predictability and consist-
ently procompetitive results.").
146. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 121 ("Consumer welfare
analysis should determine whether or not internal league rules will be treated as
per se legal. To allow the analysis to turn on some other standard that has no
relationship to the overriding consumer welfare policy of antitrust law would be
arbitrary, irrational, and illegitimate."); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71,
at 579 ("The question of whether sports leagues should be treated as single entities
or perpetual conspiracies when they make league management decisions ought to
be resolved through an analysis of which approach is most consistent with con-
sumer welfare."); Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 985 ("The lawfulness of a
sports league practice should be judged on whether the practice on balance en-
hances or retards consumer welfare."); see generally Grauer Tulane Article, supra
note 92 (applying consumer welfare considerations to sport league antitrust
analysis).
147. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 140 (noting that internal
league rules are meant to promote efficiency); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8,
at 237 (supporting court decisions finding internal league rules promote effi-
ciency). Roberts notes that team competition, in whatever miniscule form it exists,
is like competition among different sales departments of the same organization:
intra-organizational rivalry is allowed within the larger organization so as to pro-
vide incentives for performance and thereby increase efficiency and produce a
better product for the customer at a lower cost. See id. at 574-76 (explaining team
competition as legal); see also Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 968 ("Virtu-
ally every league rule or practice reduces intraleague rivalry.").
148. See Roberts USC Article, supra note 105, at 1015 (finding that application
of Section I to internal league rules is illogical, counterproductive, and detrimen-
tal to consumer welfare).
149. See Roberts '89 Tulane Article, supra note 41, at 145 (concluding that not
employing per se approach can only injure consumer welfare to detriment of anti-
trust policy); Roberts UCLA Article, supra note 8, at 296 (noting that "The proper
standard should be that all sports league rules, decisions, or practices are pre-
sumed to be the internal operational actions of a single firm" and only in ex-
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The Pro-NFL Argument does not draw its muster solely from
scholarly opinion, although it is admittedly top-heavy in this re-
gard. 150 A recent case that addressed the antitrust status of a pro-
fessional sports league, albeit the NBA as opposed to the NFL, was
Chicago Prof l Sports Ltd. Pship v. Nat'l Basketball Assoc.151 In that
case, the Seventh Circuit explored the legality of an exclusive televi-
sion broadcast contract entered into by the league. 152
The Seventh Circuit declared that the NBA's conduct was per-
missible after likening the league to a parent of a fast food restau-
rant chain. 153 To solidify the actions of the league as the actions of
one entity, the court turned to the league's collective production of
a single entertainment product. 154 The Seventh Circuit thus con-
cluded the league's exclusive broadcast contract looked more like
the legal decision of one company trying to compete in its market
than the illegal concerted decision of numerous actors.' 55
Support for the Pro-NFL argument also comes from two per-
suasive dissenting opinions. 156 Justice William Rehnquist, for exam-
traordinary circumstances should "consumer-welfare-oriented rule of reason"
approach be employed).
150. See Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71 (conceding that most courts
have found against sports leagues on single entity issue but growing weight of
scholarly opinion is to contrary); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 761 ("All of
the major articles exclusively addressing the single entity issue have recommended
that leagues be treated as single entities for most, if not all, league decisions.").
151. See Chicago Profi Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d 593 at 593 (holding that pro-
fessional sports leagues are single entities for antitrust purposes). This case sup-
ports the Pro-NFL side because of the similarities between the two leagues and
because the court in Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship made no mention of limiting its
holding to basketball leagues. See id. (neglecting to limit holding to NBA).
152. See id. at 595.
153. See id. at 598 (likening sports leagues to fast food restaurant chains).
The court found that "[The] functions of independent team ownership do not
imply that the league is a cartel, however, any more than separate ownership of
hamburger joints .. . implies that McDonald's is a cartel." Id. Finding that the
league and its teams comprise one entity, the court then proclaimed that antitrust
law encourages cooperation inside a company so as to facilitate competition be-
tween it and other companies in the same market. See Id. (concluding on single
entity determination).
154. See id. ("We see no reason why a sports league cannot be treated as a
single firm in this typology. It produces a single product.") (emphasis in original).
Because the court saw fit to characterize the league as a single firm competing in a
market for entertainment, it found that cooperation amongst the different teams
was essential. See id. (finding cooperation essential to firm competing in market).
155. See id. (accepting single entity defense).
156. See Nat'l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) [hereinafter Rehnquist dis-
sent] (advocating for use of single entity status for NFL); Los Angeles Mem'l Coli-
seum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1405 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Williams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) [hereinafter Williams dissent]
(detailing practical reasons in favor of viewing NFL as single entity).
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pie, considered the NFL to be a joint venture and thus incapable of
illegal concerted action. 157 He incorporated into his reasoning the
idea that the NFL produces one product - NFL Football - which
competes in the entertainment market.1 58 Rehnquist considered
this arrangement, where "The league competes as a unit against
other forms of entertainment," to be a "matter of necessity."'159 Al-
though he would have applied the rule of reason approach to the
NFL, he agreed with the Pro-NFL argument that agreements in the
sports context should be valid because they benefit the consumer
welfare. 160 Ultimately, Justice Rehnquist would have approved of
the league rule in question because such rules do not violate anti-
trust laws. 16 1
Judge Spencer Williams of the Ninth Circuit has also turned in
a strongly worded dissent in favor of the single entity defense. 162
Like Dean Roberts, Judge Williams lobbied against an "unwar-
ranted emphasis upon the formalistic aspects of the relationship of
the NFL and the member clubs."' 63 Similarly, he found that NFL
clubs are not competitors in the economic sense. 164 Judge Wil-
liams' own words provide clarity on his adoption of the Pro NFL
Argument:
157. See Rehnquist Dissent, supra note 156, at 1077 (describing NFL owners as
'joint venturers"). Justice Rehnquist devoted much of his opinion to distinguish-
ing competition on the field versus the economic competition that is the basis of
the Sherman Act. See id. (noting NFL's engagement in permissible form of
competition).
158. See id. ("The NFL owners are joint ventures who produce a product, pro-
fessional football, which competes with other sports and other forms of entertain-
ment in the entertainment market.").
159. Rehnquist Dissent, supra note 156, at 1077. Rehnquist explains that the
cooperation between NFL teams is "necessary to permit the league to create an
appealing product in the entertainment market." Id. Further, he notes that, "NFL
Football is a different product from what the NFL teams could offer indepen-
dently." Id.
160. See id. at 1976-79 (discussing application of Rule of Reason in present
case and benefit to consumer welfare that would result).
161. See generally id. (discussing league's single entity status, consumer welfare
implications, and viability of rule in question).
162. See generally Williams Dissent, supra note 156 (advocating for single entity
defense).
163. Id. at 1404. Judge Williams argues that a court should place more em-
phasis on the "significant interdependency of the member clubs and the indivisi-
bility of the clubs with the NFL." Id.
164. See id. at 1405 (commenting that profound interdependency between
NFL teams supports conclusion that they are not economically meaningful com-
petitors). Conversely, the majority believed that NFL teams compete in various
ways off the field. See id. at 1390 (listing ways in which NFL teams compete in
economically meaningful ways).
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[F] unctionally distinct units that cannot produce separate,
individual goods or services absent coordination are inex-
tricably bound in an economic sense, and must adopt cer-
tain intra-league instrumentalities to regulate the wholes
"downstream output". In the case of the member clubs,
this "downstream output" is professional football, and the
organ of regulation is ... the N.F.L. There is virtually no
practical distinction between the League ... and the mem-
ber clubs; the N.F.L. represents to all clubs . . . the least-
costly and most efficient manner of reaching day-to-day
decisions regarding the production of their main, and col-
lectively produced product. 1 65
Finally, Judge Williams echoed the conclusion of the Pro-NFL
side that the single entity defense should apply to the NFL and its
member teams.166
C. The NFL and its Teams Constitute Separate Entities
While Dean Gary Roberts is largely considered to be at the
forefront of the Pro-NFL argument, Professor Daniel E. Lazaroff of
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles is arguably Roberts' antithesis. 167
Like Roberts, Professor Lazaroff is considered an expert scholarly
commentator in the fields of sports and business law. 168 Indeed,
Roberts and Lazaroff have spent a great deal of time arguing sports
law issues, which makes it appropriate to use their articles as the
vehicle for analyzing their respective positions.1 69
165. Id. at 1406. Judge Williams continued by noting that NFL teams cannot
compete economically, because the only product that is in their separate interests
to produce can result only as a fruit of theirjoint efforts. See id. at 1407 (discussing
unity of economic interests between league teams).
166. See id. at 1405-07 (concluding that NFL and its teams constitute single
entity for antitrust purposes, placing them outside scope of Section I).
167. See Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 563-66 (establishing his
article as direct refutation of arguments and conclusions made by Professor
Lazaroff).
168. See Loyola Law School of Los Angeles, Faculty Profiles, http://
www.ls.edu/academics/faculty/lazaroff.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2009) (detailing
Lazaroff's career). Professor Lazaroff is the director of Loyola Law School's Sports
Law Institute. See id. (listing Lazaroffs position). He has written extensively in the
areas of antitrust and sports law and is a member of the Sports Lawyers Association
of America. See id. (chronicling Lazaroff's achievements). Using Professor
Lazaroff's arguments as the example of the Pro-American Needle argument is es-
pecially convenient since he, at numerous times, takes direct exception with Dean
Roberts' views, and vice versa. See generally Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32
(refuting assertions made by Roberts).
169. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 957 (admitting direct disagree-
ment with Roberts on fundamental points concerning antitrust application to pro-
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"The Pro-American Needle" argument concludes that profes-
sional sports leagues and their teams should be viewed as separate
entities. 170 The core of the Pro-American Needle position is that
professional sports teams are separate economic entities capable of
competing against each other both on and off the field of play. 171
Ultimately, this argument ardently contends that a rule of reason,
and not a per se rule approach, should be used in the antitrust
analysis of professional sports leagues. 172
Much of the Pro-American Needle argument is concerned with
casting doubt on the single entity theory championed by the Pro-
NFL side.' 73 The first step is to characterize NFL teams as separate
fessional sports leagues); Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 563-66
(noting difference of opinion with Lazaroff on single entity and other sports
league antitrust issues).
170. See generally Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32 (detailing reasons for
rejecting single entity defense); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of
Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 157 (1984)
[hereinafter Lazaroff Fordham Article] (casting doubt on single entity defense);
Goldman Article, supra note 14 (refuting single entity supporters and providing
support for Pro-American Needle position); Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports
Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J.
25 (1991) [hereinafter Jacobs Article] (arguing against single entity defense be-
cause sports league teams are separate entities); Marc Edelman, Why the "Single
Entity" Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in
Professional Sports, 18 FoRDAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891 [hereinafter
Edelman article] (advocating against use of single entity defense for NFL teams);
see also Daniel E. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An Antitrust Analysis, 34
GA. L. REv. 137 (1999) [hereinafter Lazaroff Georgia Article] (exploring single
entity defense among other sports league antitrust issues).
171. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 954 (characterizing profes-
sional sports teams as separate actors capable of concerted activity for Section I
purposes); Lazaroff Fordham Article, supra note 170, at 166 (noting that profes-
sional sports teams are separately owned and do not share unity of interest);
Lazaroff Georgia Article, supra note 170, at 150-52 (suggesting that sports teams
are economic rivals); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 753-55 (explaining alle-
giance with Pro-American Needle side of single entity question); Jacobs Article,
supra note 170, at 30 ("Single-entity status is inappropriate and unnecessary for
professional sports leagues."); Edelman Article, supra note 170, at 893 (declaring
that courts should find that sports clubs are separate economic entities).
172. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 963 (advocating for rule of
reason approach rather than per se rule approach in sports law context); Lazaroff
Fordham Article, supra note 170, at 162 (considering rule of reason versus per se
rule debate in antitrust cases); Lazaroff Georgia Article, supra note 170, at 148
("When dealing with antitrust claims regarding the business of sports, courts gen-
erally reject reliance on per se principles and almost always require plaintiffs to
satisfy the full-blown rule of reason standard."); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at
772-73 (advocating for rule of reason approach to sports antitrust cases); Jacobs
Article, supa note 170, at 30 (supporting rule of reason analysis).
173. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at Section II ("Rejecting Single
Entity Status for Sports Leagues."); Lazaroff Fordham Article, supra note 170, at
175 ("Case law and public policy both militate in favor of a conclusion that sports
teams, as separately owned and independent legal entities, are capable of combin-
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entities capable of independent economic production. 74 Professor
Lazaroff offers several thoughtful examples to support this Pro-
American Needle contention: an all-star team that competes inter-
nationally, for example. 175 Other commentators also provide prac-
tical examples of how NFL teams are economically significant
outside of a league setting.1 76
Chiefly, Lazaroff argues that it is possible for a professional
team, like the Harlem Globetrotters, to be profitable outside of the
league structure through barnstorming and other ad hoc arrange-
ments. 177 Seemingly, while the decision to be part of a league likely
adds to a team's profitability, a league is not a team's only option
for profit.178 The argument follows that, if teams were permitted to
ing for Section I purposes."); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 761 (characteriz-
ing Pro-NFL argument's single entity theory as unpersuasive and potentially
dangerous);Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at 29-30 (commenting on incorrectness
of single entity theory); see generally Edelman Article, supra note 170 (explaining
why single entity defense can never apply to professional sports leagues); see also
Lazaroff Georgia Article, supra note 170, (extrapolating on independence of sports
teams).
174. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at Section I1-A ("Sports Teams
can be Viable, Independent Economic Entities."); Lazaroff Fordham Article, supra
note 170, at 175 (noting that NFL teams are not divisions of same organization and
are not commonly owned or operated); Edelman Article, supra note 170, at 925
(concluding that sports clubs exhibit characteristics of separate economic
entities).
175. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 958-60 (offering examples to
support assertions that it is incorrect to suggest that sports teams are without value
unless they exist within league structure).
176. See Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 763-65 (casting doubt on Roberts'
assertions that NFL teams are nothing outside of league structure). Professor
Goldman argues against Dean Roberts' view by likening NFL teams to McDonald's
franchises. See id. at 764 (providing McDonalds analogy). He contends that inde-
pendent McDonald's franchises are considered separate entities, yet likely would
be less productive economically outside of the parent enterprise. See id. (conclud-
ing that McDonald's franchises, like NFL teams, can operate outside parent struc-
ture). ProfessorJacobs also joins this argument. SeeJacobs Article, supra note 170,
at 30 (arguing that distinctions between NFL and other joint ventures are facially
superficial).
177. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 959 (discussing barnstorming
and ad hoc team capabilities). Other examples of team profit potential external of
the league context include: (1) professional players organizing games to raise
funds for charity, (2) independent college teams like Notre Dame that are not
associated with a particular conference, (3) all-star teams organized to play in ex-
tra-league or international competition, and (4) intra-squad scrimmages. See id.
(listing profitable team ad hoc arrangements). The Harlem Globetrotters fit num-
ber (3) above, and are profitable despite not belonging to a particular league. See
Jack McCallum, Surely They Jest: The Globetrotters Want to be the Best at a lot More than
Clowning Around, SPORTS ItusTrIAmn, Mar. 19, 2001, available at http://sportsillus-
trated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1022014/index.htm (detailing fi-
nancial and athletic history of Harlem Globetrotters).
178. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 962 (arguing for team profit
potential outside of league context). Lazaroff notes that:
20101
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barnstorm, meaning play outside of the league, they would.1 79 This
line of reasoning goes to show that individual teams are capable of
producing a sports-entertainment product outside the league con-
text.180 This is because fans are willing to pay to see teams with
talented athletes compete, regardless of league setting.18 ' Ulti-
mately, the Pro-American Needle side finds that "To state that
teams are 'nothing' without a league is simply incorrect."
182
Next, the proponents of the Pro-American Needle argument
contend that the separate ownership of the teams militates in favor
of their argument.1 83 At a first cut, they argue that team revenues
and costs are largely a function of individual team activity.18 4 Addi-
tionally, individual teams compete for things like players, coaches,
Barnstorming versus league play is a matter of choice, not an economic
imperative. Individual teams must cooperate to produce a league prod-
uct, but the same degree of integration is not essential to produce a sport
for profit. It is truly a matter of choice.
Id; see also Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at 54 (suggesting that league structure
adds to profitability but teams have other options).
179. See Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 789-90 (evaluating league versus
barnstorming options). Goldman notes that, once a team is part of a league, the
team is prohibited from staging exhibitions because the league does not want to
compete with its own members. See id. (explaining teams' lack of barnstorming
options).
180. See Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 771 ("Teams are capable of pro-
ducing a sports entertainment product outside a league venture."). Goldman sites
numerous examples to refute Roberts' basic premise and exemplify how teams can
generate a successful entertainment product regardless of league affiliation. See id.
at 771-72 (mentioning Notre Dame Football and United States Olympic Basketball
as successful, non-league affiliated teams).
181. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 960 (maintaining that notion
of independent teams with talented players competing to draw fans is not so far-
fetched as to be economically insignificant).
182. Id. at 959. Quite simply, Lazaroff argues that team owners could organ-
ize teams, schedule a game with another team, rent out venues, charge tickets for
admission, and turn a profit, all external of a league context. See id. (supporting
idea that teams can exist outside of league). Lazaroff bases this argument on the
premise that, "A single team consisting of talented players could have great value,
irrespective of any league affiliation" because fans are always willing to pay to see
good athletes perform. Id. According to Lazaroff, "[I]n the eye of the consuming
fan, the real product is the sport and not the league." Id.
183. See LazaroffASU Article, supra note 32, at 962 ("[S]eparate ownership of
teams alone may be adequate to qualify them for separate entity status."); Lazaroff
Fordham Article, supra note 170, at 175 (commenting that separately owned and
operated teams are capable of combining for Section I purposes); Goldman Arti-
cle, supra note 14, at 762 (casting doubt on Roberts' dismissal of separate owner-
ship as relevant in single entity determination); Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at
45 ("Nowhere else in law does the nature of an entity depend upon the particular
subject matter that it happens to be considering but not upon its form or its gen-
eral function.").
184. See Lazaroff ASU Article, sup-a note 32, at 963 (detailing individual team
revenue structure. Lazaroff notes that:
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front office personnel, and fan support.1 85 The Pro-American Nee-
dle side also argues that the "Function over Form" distinction
presented in various Supreme Court cases does not hurt their
argument.'8
6
Like the Pro-NFL side, Pro-American Needle scholars believe
that Copperweld acts in their favor.' 8 7 Lazaroff and his cohorts stress
that the Copperweld Court expressly limited its holding to the par-
ent/wholly owned subsidiary relationship.188 Further, they point
out language in Copperweld runs contrary to the way the Pro-NFL
side would seek to use the case to support their argument.189
Chiefly, it is argued that the Pro-NFL side inappropriately makes
Expenses are not shared, profits and losses are not shared, local radio
and televisions revenues are not shared, luxury box revenues are not
shares, and parking and concessions revenue are not shared.
Id; see also Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 763 (examining teams as indepen-
dent marketplace entities that have personal stakes in terms of separate profits and
losses); Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at 43 (noting that NFL teams compete in a
variety of economically meaningful ways). But see Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra
note 71 (considering pooling of team revenues into league pot).
185. See LazaroffASU Article, supra note 32, at 963-64 (considering non-reve-
nue oriented ways in which teams compete); Lazaroff Fordham Article, supra note
170, at 169 (citing judicial opinion that lists additional ways in which professional
sports teams compete); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 758 (finding that teams
make their own decisions and affect their own profitability when considering ticket
prices, player acquisitions and salaries, and hiring of coaches and front office per-
sonnel); Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at 45-46 (considering team competition
that must be quelled by league rules).
186. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 965 (downplaying function
over form argument). For a further discussion on the function over form argu-
ment, see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
187. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 965 (commenting that "An
overly expansive and rather imaginative reading" of Copperweld is necessary to find
that it supports Roberts' view); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 787 (arguing
against Weistart's reading of Copperweld); Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at 43
(characterizing Pro-NFL's view of Copperweld as flawed); Edelman Article, supra
note 170, at 926 ("Not only does denying the 'single entity defense' conform to the
Supreme Court's earlier holding in Capperweld, but this conclusion is sound public
policy.").
188. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 965 (stressing express limita-
tions in holding of Copperweld majority); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 793-94
(arguing that Copperweld supports Pro-American Needle viewpoints) ;Jacobs Article,
supra note 170, at 35-37 (highlighting narrowness of Copperweld).
189. See, e.g., Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 965-66 (considering Cop-
perweld language). Lazaroff notes that, "The idea that a parent company may 'as-
sert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best
interests' was critical to the [Copperweld] majority's view." Id. He then notes that,
"In contrast, neither the league office nor any team within a league may simply
Iassert full control' over another team whenever it chooses." Id. at 966.
2010]
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too much of the Copperweld Court's "unity of interest" line of
reasoning. 190
Nor does Copperweld stand for the functional, economic reality-
based approach advocated by Dean Roberts, according to the Pro-
American Needle side.' 91 Rather, Copperweld presents a structured,
formal review of business relationships without rising to the level of
"form over function. ' 192 Even Copperweld's progeny, it is argued, has
not affected its application to sports leagues. 193 Lazaroff concludes
this line of reasoning by stating that, "Rather than characterize the
status of teams within a league as the equivalent of a parent and its
wholly-owned subsidiary, it seems more accurate to view them as
independent firms whose cooperation produces a new and some-
what different product than any could produce alone."194
After refuting the single entity defense, the Pro-American Nee-
dle argument turns to the application of Section I to professional
sports leagues. 195 They believe sports league antitrust cases should
always result in a rule of reason analysis. 196 Generally, this ap-
190. See id. at 966 (casting doubt on Roberts' use of Copperweld's unity of inter-
est reasoning to support his conclusions); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 796
(applying unity of interest reasoning to sports leagues); Jacobs article, supra note
170, at 37 (arguing that unity of interest reasoning does not support Pro-NFL
side); Edelman Article, supra note 170, at 893 (discounting complete unity of inter-
est in sports leagues).
191. SeeJacobs Article, supra note 170, at 41 (noting that Copperweld court did
not adopt Dean Roberts' approach and actually paid no attention to economic
realities of business relationships).
192. See Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at 41-42 (describing formal aspects,
such as direct ownership, focused on by Copperweld court).
193. See LazaroffASU Article, supra note 32, at 970 (" [I]f [Copperweld] has had
any effect on judicial treatment of teams within a league for antitrust purposes,
that effect is not apparent from the recent cases.");Jacobs Article, supra note 170,
at 37-39 (contending that case law since Copperweld does not help Pro-NFL argu-
ment); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 771 ("Professor Roberts' standard ... is
inconsistent with Supreme Court authority.").
194. Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 964. This quote is buttressed by
arguments against applying Copperweld in the league context. See id. at 965-70 (pro-
viding reasons not to apply Copperweld to leagues). For instance, Lazaroff notes
that Copperweld was limited to the parent-subsidiary context, because a parent can
assert full control over a subsidiary at any time - something the NFL cannot do.
See id. at 965-66 (explaining assertion of full control by parent). Professor Jacobs
concludes by proclaiming that "[Copperweld] thus provides no support whatsoever
to the advocates of single-entity treatment for professional sports leagues." Jacobs
Article, supra note 170, at 37.
195. See, e.g., Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 970 (shifting analysis
from single entity theory to rule of reason application).
196. See, e.g., LazaroffASU Aricle, supra note 32, at 972 (discussing prevalence
of rule of reason and referring to it as foundation of antitrust analysis). Professor
Lazaroff is not arguing for the per se invalidity of all professional sports league
rules, but rather, for a cautious rule of reason approach to each league decision.
See id. at 963 (advocating for rule of reason approach). This approach, he argues,
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proach tends to be preferable because sports league antitrust issues
are confusing and have generated incongruous results.19 7 This un-
certainty militates in favor of a rule of reason approach instead of a
per se rule approach. l9 8
Lobbying further for a rule of reason approach, Professor
Lazaroff notes that, "Although efficiencies may be realized from the
contractual arrangements entered into by [league teams], there is
also potential for anticompetitive consequences."19 9 Similarly, the
Supreme Court prefers a rule of reason approach, except in a nar-
row category of cases that have nothing to do with the NFL and its
teams. 200 Lazaroff concludes by proclaiming that, not only do the
facts warrant a rule of reason analysis for professional sports
leagues, but the desire to avoid negative policy implications also ra-
tionalizes this approach. 20 1
will neither insulate all intra-league practices nor, at the other extreme, condemn
all of them. See id. at 963-64 (discussing effects of rule of reason approach). As
such, the standard rule of reason analysis would be the happy medium that allows
"an antitrust plaintiff to proffer evidence to support a claim that the challenged
practice is, on balance, unreasonable." Id. at 964.
197. For a further discussion of the uncertainty concerning the application of
antitrust law to profession sports league, see supra notes 76-78, 92-94 and accompa-
nying text.
198. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 975 (noting that analysis of
sports league practices should follow rule of reason approach because unique
structure of league sports has caused courts to be reluctant to apply per se rule);
Lazaroff Fordham Article, supra note 170, at 175-76 (arguing for rule of reason
approach to professional sports leagues); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 796
(advocating for rule of reason approach to sports leagues because of important
questions per se rule will miss); Jacobs Article, supra note 170, at 44 (explaining
negatives to abandoning rule of reason approach).
199. Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 964. Lazaroff warns that "Fans
may have real choices and be insulated from the 'take it or leave it' attitude that
might flow from monopoly of significant market power." Id. at 964-65.
200. See id. at 971 (noting cases where Supreme Court relied on per se rules
to resolve antitrust disputes). Only in cases where the illegality if the alleged con-
duct is so inherently anticompetitive - i.e. price fixing - does the Court prefer a
per se rule approach. See id. (explaining reasons for per se rule in narrow, inher-
ently anticompetitive circumstances). Rather, the Court has placed emphasis
upon the rule of reason approach as "the main guidepost of antitrust analysis." Id.
at 972. The Court prefers this approach because it takes all things into account
when balancing the "procompetitive and anticompetitive effects" of the challenged
practice. Id.
201. See id. at 984 (summarizing reasons not to adopt Roberts' approach).
Lazaroff points out that, if courts were to adopt a per se rule of allowing sports
leagues to operate without Section I scrutiny, they would, in later cases, "fail to
even consider the anticompetitive effects of intraleague practices and the accom-
panying adverse effect on consumer wealth." Id. He argues that rule of reason
analysis is absolutely necessary because, while certain league agreements, such as
the scheduling of games and the adoption of rules of play, may be valid and pro-
duce no anticompetitive effect, other agreements may have significant anticompe-
2010]
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The Pro-American Needle supporters then present an exten-
sive parade of horribles that would result if Roberts' proposed per
se rule is adopted. 20 2 For instance, Professor Lazaroff argues that a
per se rule would completely insulate intraleague practices from
Section I scrutiny.20 3 Similarly, Professor Jacobs maintains that,
contrary to the Pro-NFL argument, a per se approach would not
achieve the goals of the consumer welfare model.20 4 Finally, Profes-
sor Goldman asserts that a per se approach would fail to address
numerous considerations in future cases, such as the possible rea-
sonableness of the action. 20 5
The Pro-American Needle argument also finds support from
the courts. 20 6 Indeed, the Pro-NFL side has conceded that the ma-
jority of judicial decisions interpreting the Section I status of sports
leagues follows the Pro-American Needle argument.20 7 One such
case is Sullivan H! v. Nat' Football League.2° 8 In Sullivan, a team
owner sued the league claiming that its policy against public owner-
ship of teams illegally prevented him from selling a minority share
titive effects and need to be judicially scrutinized. See id. at 986 (arguing that per
se rule should not be applied even if it is appropriate for some league decisions).
202. See id. at 963 (giving reasons in favor of adopting rule of reason instead
of per se rule); Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 777 (detailing negative effects
that would result following application of per se rule); Jacobs Article, supra note
170, at 47 n.85 (discussing reasons for courts' acceptance of rule of reason over
per se approach).
203. See Lazaroff ASU Article, supra note 32, at 963 (citing Roberts' tendency
to minimize important business aspects in an effort to insulate leagues from Sec-
tion I scrutiny as reason to reject per se approach). Professor Lazaroff believes it is
more appropriate to allow an antitrust plaintiff to proffer evidence in support of
his claim then to bar him at the summary judgment stage. See id. at 964 (advocat-
ing for allowing plaintiff to present evidence to determine if challenged practice is
unreasonable).
204. SeeJacobs Article, supra note 170, at 48-49 (framing per se rule versus
rule of reason issue as one concerning consumer welfare). Professor Jacobs then
lists numerous Supreme Court antitrust cases in which a per se rule was rejected
because the Court found it more appropriate to delve into the possible effects on
consumer welfare, rather than create a blanket per se rule for all similar situations.
See id. at 50-53 (listing Supreme Court cases rejecting per se rule in antitrust
context).
205. See Goldman Article, supra note 14, at 778 ("[A per se standard] fails to
recognize the significance of co-venturers' independent market-place identities,
mistakenly assumes that joint ventures will always further consumer welfare, and
threatens to make all vertical restraints per se legal and overrule other major bod-
ies of established precedent.").
206. See id. at Section II-B (examining judicial treatment of single entity
theory).
207. For a further discussion on the Pro-NFL side's concession that judicial
weight backs the Pro-American Needle argument, see supra note 149 and accompa-
nying text.
208. 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994).
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in his team. 20 9 The First Circuit found that, under Copperweld, a pre-
sumption of single entity status for sports leagues does not exist
because the teams are not the league's subsidiaries. 210
The court resolved the single entity issue by asking whether or
not the league's teams could compete with each other in the mar-
ket in which the owner was alleging injury.211 After analyzing the
league's structure and the relevant market, the court found that
teams could indeed compete with each other, economically as well
as athletically.2 12 Finding that NFL teams constitute separate enti-
ties that compete against each other in an economic sense gave the
First Circuit a plurality of actors, and allowed it to conclude that the
NFL's public ownership policy constituted an unreasonable re-
straint of trade. 21 3
Another case that adopts the Pro-American Needle point of
view is Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League.2 14
In LA Coliseum, the officials of a sports arena alleged that an NFL
rule restricting stadium tenancy violated antitrust law.2 15 The court
again looked to defining the proper market as well as the single
209. See id. at 1096 (claiming NFL violated Sherman Act by preventing Sulli-
van from selling his forty-nine percent share to public in equity offering). Al-
though the league did not have an official policy against public ownership of
teams, the commissioner wrote to the owner and strongly advised against such a
move. See id. Consequently, the owner had to sell his team at a fire sale price. See
id. He then brought an antitrust action against the league, contending that its
public ownership rule, or policy, was a conspiracy in restraint of trade. See id.
210. See id. at 1099 (detailing court's rejection of NFL's Copperweld argument).
But see Williams Dissent, supra note 155 (finding credence in NFL's Copperweld
argument).
211. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099 ("The question [is]... whether or not the
evidence can support a finding that NFL teams compete against each other for the
sale of their ownership interests."). The court concluded on this issue by stating
that, "The jury's finding that there exists competition between teams for the sale of
ownership interests was based on sufficient evidence." Id.
212. See id (maintaining that critical inquiry is whether alleged conspirators
have unity of interest). The court noted that "NFL member clubs compete in sev-
eral ways off the field, which itself tends to show that the teams pursue diverse
interests and thus are not a single enterprise under [Section I]." Id.
213. See id. at 1099-1103 (finding that league-wide policy to restrict public
ownership of teams violated Section I). One factor weighing on the court's reason-
ing was that the policy produced anti-competitive market effects. See id. at 1101
(listing negative effects of policy on market). It found that there was a market for
ownership interest in teams and the league's policy effectively injured competition
in that market. See id. at 1100 (defining relevant market and injury to that market
as a result of league anticompetitive action).
214. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
215. See id. at 1385 (challenging NFL rule as unlawful restraint of trade in
violation of Section I). The NFL rule in question stated that no NFL team can
relocate to a venue within the home territory of another team without unanimous
approval of the other teams. See id. (detailing allegedly unlawful NFL rule).
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entity question. 216 In deciding the single entity issue, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the NFL constituted a group of separately owned
teams and not one entity.2 17
The court agreed that NFL teams must cooperate to produce a
product.21 8 Still, it found that NFL teams are "sufficiently indepen-
dent and competitive with one another to warrant rule of reason
scrutiny under [Section I]."219 In making its conclusion, the court
considered the separate ownership of the teams and the negative
policy implications that would result from a finding that the NFL
teams constitute one entity.220 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's rejection of the NFL's single entity
defense. 221
IV. ORAL ARGUMENT
2 2 2
A. On Behalf of American Needle 223
Counsel for American Needle began his argument by solidi-
fying the issue presented in the case: whether a plurality of actors
216. See id. (identifying legal questions at issue in case).
217. See id. at 1388-89 (upholding district court's finding based on notion that
other organizations had been found to violate Section I through similar acts). The
court concluded by saying that, "While the NFL clubs have certain common pur-
poses, they do not operate as a single entity. NFL policies are not set by one indi-
vidual or parent corporation, but by the separate teams acting jointly." Id. The
court then cited Supreme Court authority to support its position that NFL teams
are separate entities and not a joint venture. See id. at 1388 (quoting Supreme
Court authority on issue).
218. See id. at 1389 ("It is true the NFL clubs must cooperate to a large extent
in their endeavor in producing a 'product' - the NFL season culminating in the
Super Bowl.").
219. Id. at 1399. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that "The
unique nature of the business of professional football made application of a per se
rule inappropriate." Id. at 1387.
220. See id. at 1390 (listing reasoning points). In making its ruling, the court
relied on the fact that NFL teams are single entities and that profits and losses are
not shared, despite the common sharing of revenue. See id. (noting reasons for
rejecting single entity defense). Second, the court found that the teams compete
vigorously off the field for players, coaches, and management personnel. See id.
(finding ways in which teams compete and thus are not separate entities). Finally,
the court voiced concern that a contrary ruling would completely insulate the NFL
from Section I scrutiny. See id. at 1388 (citing policy reasons for rejecting NFL's
single entity defense).
221. See id. at 1389 (rejecting single entity defense by NFL).
222. See generally Oral Argument, supra note 9 (relating transcript of oral
argument). Oral argument in the American Needle case took place before the
Supreme Court on January 13, 2010. See id. at 1 (introducing case to Court for oral
argument).
223. See id. at 3 (introducing argument of Petitioner). Counsel for American
Needle was Glen D. Nager, Esq. See id. (introducing counsel for Petitioner). Mr.
Nager is a partner atJones Day and head of the firm's Issues and Appeals Practice.
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exists in the sports league context - i.e. whether Section I should
apply to sports leagues. 224 American Needle's chief allegation then
presented:
The 32 teams of the National Football League are sepa-
rately owned and controlled profit-making enterprises
.... The 32 teams of the National Football League have
entered into an agreement and control the use, collec-
tively, of the trademarks and logos of the individual teams.
And for that reason, there is concerted activity [between a
plurality of actors in violation of Section I] that is
involved.225
Much like Lazaroff and his supporters, Counsel for petitioner
spent much time arguing that Supreme Court precedent militates
in favor of American Needle's case. 226 While mainly arguing
against a single entity defense for sports leagues, counsel for peti-
tioner also strongly advocated, in a related argument, for a rule of
reason approach. 227 Ultimately, petitioner maintained that NFL
teams are separately owned entities coming together to make a de-
cision that restricts trade, and that such action is a fundamental
violation of Section .228
See Jones Day - Glen D. Nager, http://www.jonesday.com/gdnager/, (last visited
Jan. 25, 2010) (describing Mr. Nager's background and practice).
224. See Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 4-5 (identifying issue). Counsel for
Petitioner also identified the secondary issue of whether or not the agreement
between the teams to grant an exclusive license to Reebok constitutes concerted
activity under Section I. See id. at 20 (identifying secondary issue).
225. See id. at 3-5 (presenting petitioner's chief allegation of NFL's concerted
activity).
226. See id. at 4 (arguing that Supreme Court precedentjustifies a finding that
NFL's conduct amounted to horizontal restraints on competition in violation of
Section I).
227. See id. at 7 (presenting arguments against per se rule approach and for
rule of reason approach). Counsel for petitioner than stated that:
If something is deemed not to be concerted conduct, then it's per se, not
subject to Section I, and per se legal. And I think for the Court's jurispru-
dence over the last 30 years, the Court has been trying to get out of per se
rules and have a more focused inquiry into what the anticompetitive ef-
fects and pro-competitive effects of a particular restraint are.
Id.
228. See id. at 12 (proclaiming that separate nature of NFL teams necessitates
finding against league as single entity). Counsel for petitioner concluded by stat-
ing that:
[The teams of the NFL] are separate decision-makers joining together,
and they are making a decision about how they are going to jointly pro-
duce something or not produce something. And that's what makes is
concerted activity under this Court's consistent teachings. The distinc-
tion between unilateral activity under Section I and concerted activity
2010]
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B. On Behalf of the United States Government 229
The United States appeared as amicus curiae and supported
neither party. 230 Indeed, the government rejected the notion that
its position was "four square" in support of either party's theory of
the case or interpretation of the issue. 231 Nevertheless, the United
States conceded that the acts of the NFL looked a lot like the acts of
a single entity.23 2 Each team's seemingly lawful delegation of deci-
sion-making power to the Commissioner was the foundation of the
government's point of view. 233 The deputy solicitor general con-
cluded by proffering that, while the delegations of authority by all
thirty two teams to the commissioner looks like a single entity, the
concerted conduct of two teams acting alone looks more like a Sec-
tion I violation. 234
C. On Behalf of the NFL2
3 5
Respondent contends that the NFL is a lawful joint venture
whose decisions are unilateral venture actions and not the con-
under Section I has consistently been the distinction between ownership
integration of assets and contract integration of assets.
Id.
229. See id. at 28 (introducing argument of United States as amicus curiae).
Mr. Malcolm L. Stewart, Esq., deputy solicitor general, presented the argument for
the federal government. See id. (introducing Mr. Stewart).
230. See id. (beginning government's argument and showing that its intention
was to stay neutral).
231. See id. ("The United States is not four-square in support of either party's
theory in this case.").
232. See id. (noting that centralized decisions of league office look like con-
duct of single entity).
233. See id. at 28-29 (considering teams' delegation of decision making au-
thority to NFL commissioner and NFL Properties). The deputy solicitor general
then noted that:
If the commissioner, pursuant to [his] delegation of authority, decides
from which company to acquire paper for the League's offices or decides
what the weight scale for secretaries in the League offices should be, our
view is that that's the conduct of a single entity.
Id.
234. See id. at 31-32 (examining distinction that could decide case). The dep-
uty solicitor general concluded by noting that:
In our view, the NFL commissioner, when carrying out those functions on
behalf of the League, would be acting as a single entity, even though his
power was derived from the consent of the teams. But if the Jets and
Giants agreed among themselves as to what wages they would pay their
secretaries or from whom they would buy paper, that would be an entirely
different thing.
Id.
235. See id. at 37 (introducing argument of respondents). Counsel for the
NFL was Gregg H. Levy, Esq. See id. (introducing counsel for Respondents). Mr.
Levy is a partner at Covington & Burling LLP and is the chair of the firm's
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certed actions of the venture's members. 23 6 Counsel for respon-
dent then stressed that the decision by the joint venture to use its
intellectual property as a promotional tool was a lawful one.237
Much like Roberts and his Pro-NFL supporters, Counsel for respon-
dent urged that the teams of the NFL are not independent sources
of economic power. 238 He further argued that the NFL is not seek-
ing absolute immunity from antitrust claims, merely an appropriate
ruling on its organizational structure. 239 Counsel for respondent
concluded by analogizing the NFL to a law firm in order to drive
home his point that, although organizationally complicated, the
NFL is a single entity and should be afforded the same legal protec-
tions as other businesses. 240
litigation group. See Covington & Burling LLP - Biographies - Gregg H. Levy,
http://www.cov.com/glevy/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) (describing Mr. Levy's
background, practice, and professional experience).
236. See Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 38 (proposing the NFL is lawful joint
venture). Counsel for respondent opened by noting that:
There is no dispute that the NFL, including its licensing arm, NFL
Properties, is a lawful venture. If venture formation is not an issue, then
decisions by the venture about the venture's product are unilateral ven-
ture decisions, unilateral venture actions. They are not concerted actions
of the venture's members.
Id.
237. See id. at 39 (presenting respondent's venture promotion argument).
Counsel for Respondent posed the question, "How should the league, how should
the venture members, best promote the venture product?" Id. He then contended
that the decision was made to use the teams' licenses for their intellectual property
as a promotional tool, and that this decision was a lawful one. See id. (maintaining
that decision to grant Reebok exclusive apparel licenses was lawful one). Implicit
in this argument is the notion that the role of intellectual product licensing is to
promote the venture's product. See id. at 41 (defining venture choices on how to
promote venture product).
238. See id. at 44 (arguing that NFL teams are not economically indepen-
dent). Counsel for Respondent made this argument by stating that, "The purpose
of the licensing here is to promote the product. It's to promote the game. And
the NFL member clubs are not independent sources of economic power in gener-
ating that game." Id.
239. See id. at 47 (clarifying that respondent does not seek absolute bar to
antitrust claims). Counsel for respondent claimed that NFL is only seeking immu-
nity from Section I claims when its member clubs are competing in the market-
place as a single entity and that NFL is still open to subsequent Section II attack.
See id. at 48 (establishing limited antitrust immunity as scope of request).
240. See id. at 62-63 (analogizing NFL to law firm to show that decisions made
by NFL are akin to those of other lawful ventures). Counsel for respondent noted
that a law firm is a lawful venture that makes lawful decisions that restrict trade,
such as deciding to do or not do business with a certain client. See id. at 62 (offer-
ing law firm analogy to make lawful venture point). Conversely, he then notes that
the decision of two partners, who leave the firm and open their own practices, to
not do business with a certain potential client, is not the lawful decision of the
venture and is the kind of decision that should be subject to Section I review. See
id. (offering distinction between lawful and unlawful venture decisions). The posi-
tion of respondent is that the NFL teams acting together resemble the former,
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V. CONCLUSION
In the end, the single entity status of sports leagues, and the
application of antitrust law to sports leagues in general, presents a
jurisprudential challenge.2 41 Understandably, this is an area of the
law that has received much judicial and scholarly attention. 242 Most
notably, a passionate debate over the single entity question has
raged for years between two competing groups of distinguished
scholars.243 On May 24th, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court opinion in a 9-0 decision, holding that although licens-
ing of intellectual property constitutes concerted action covered by
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, the competitive and non-aggregational eco-
nomic character of the NFL teams in a substance (as opposed to
form) analysis provides that the rule of reason should apply in this
case.
244
The ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision will forever
affect the way sports leagues operate and the way consumers and
other industries interact with them.245 The Pro-NFL side believes
that a professional sports league and its teams constitute a single
entity for antitrust purposes. 246 This side bases its argument on the
idea that league teams are functionally the same entity, with a com-
plete unity of interest, because they must cooperate to produce one
product.247 The Pro-NFL side would have the Supreme Court ap-
prove the NFL's single entity status, and grant sports leagues per se
antitrust legality in terms of Section I.248
lawful example, while two teams that act alone resemble the latter, unlawful exam-
ple. See id. at 62-63 (concluding that NFL's collective decision of how to promote
its product is decision of single entity).
241. For a further discussion of the ambiguity surrounding the application of
antitrust law to professional sports leagues, see supra notes 76-78, 92-94 and accom-
panying text.
242. For a further discussion of the judicial and scholarly treatment of anti-
trust issues pertaining to the NFL, see supra notes 105-221 and accompanying text.
243. For a further discussion of the intense debate over the single entity ques-
tion between the Pro-NFL and Pro-American Needle sides, see supra note 105-221
and accompanying text.
244. See American Needle Inc. v. National Football League, No. 08-661, slip
op. at 17-20. For a further discussion of American Needle, see supra notes 72-91 and
accompanying text.
245. For a further discussion of the importance of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in American Needle, see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
246. For a further discussion of the general Pro-NFL argument, see supra
notes 105-166 and accompanying text.
247. For a further discussion of the Pro-NFL side's single entity argument, see
supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
248. For a further discussion of the Pro-NFL side's per se rule argument, see
supra notes 136-149 and accompanying text.
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Conversely, the Pro-American Needle side finds that profes-
sional sports leagues and their teams are separate entities and are
capable of conspiring for antitrust purposes.249 This side bases its
argument on the idea that league teams are separately owned and
operated, have separate interests, and can produce an entertain-
ment product on their own and without the league. 250 The Pro-
American Needle side would have the Supreme Court deny the
NFL's single entity status and adopt a rule of reason approach in all
sports league antitrust cases.2 5
1
Ultimately, it seems appropriate to grant the NFL's single en-
tity request and afford its league rules per se legality in terms of
Section 1.252 The Pro-NFL side makes a strong argument when it
asserts that NFL teams, although technically separate entities, must
cooperate as one entity to produce the league product.2 53 No sin-
gle team can produce the product on its own and teams would have
little if any value outside the league context.25 4 Furthermore, since
consumer welfare is the goal of antitrust law, and a contrary ruling
would be injurious to consumer welfare, the Pro-NFL side is correct
in stating that the Court should rule in the NFL's favor. 255 Despite
judicial authority adverse to the NFL, the arguments of the Pro-NFL
commentators, which have generally been adopted by the NFL, are
compelling. 256
In refuting these points, the Pro-American Needle commenta-
tors promote form over function by overly relying on the separate
ownership of NFL teams.257 Also, their assertions about team viabil-
ity outside of the league context - i.e., through exhibitions and
249. For a further discussion of the general Pro-American Needle argument,
see supra notes 167-221 and accompanying text.
250. For a further discussion of the general Pro-American Needle argument,
see supra notes 167-221 and accompanying text.
251. For a further discussion of the Pro-American Needle side rule of reason
argument, see supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
252. For a further discussion of the Pro-NFL side's single entity argument, see
supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
253. For a further discussion of the Pro-NFL side's single entity argument, see
supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
254. For a further discussion of the Pro-NFL side's single entity argument, see
supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
255. For a further discussion of the Consumer Welfare Model, see supra notes
144-149 and accompanying text.
256. For a further discussion of the general Pro-NFL argument, see supra
notes 105-166 and accompanying text. For a further discussion ofjudicial opinion
adverse to the NFL, see supra note 150 and accompanying text. For the arguments
of the NFL in American Needle, see supra notes 235-240 and accompanying text.
257. For a further discussion of the Pro-American Needle side's separate own-
ership argument, see supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text.
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barnstorming - downplay the value of the league structure in the
eye of the consumer, as well as the increased cost of barnstorm-
ing.2 58 The Pro-American Needle side spends too much time con-
sidering the consequences of granting NFL single entity status and
per se protection and not enough time on the legal ramifications of
such a decision.2 59 Single entity status, they argue, would afford
professional sports leagues antitrust immunity.2 60 However, as
noted by counsel for the NFL at oral argument, affirmation of sin-
gle entity status would not make sports leagues immune from either
Section I or Section II suits.
261
Still, the Court does not favor per se rules and seems likely to
side with American Needle, thereby denying the NFL single entity
status.262Opting for a rule of reason analysis, of course, does not
automatically mean that the NFL's exclusive licensing contract is
illegal and that American Needle wins. 263 Rather, such a ruling
would only mean that American Needle can survive the summary
judgment stage and offer evidence as to the alleged unreasonable-
ness and anticompetitive nature of the NFL's contract with
Reebok.2 64 Ruling in this way would severely impact the NFL finan-
cially by requiring it to go through the costly antitrust discovery pro-
cess.265 Still, the NFL is more than capable of absorbing these costs,
and the Court may prefer to impose costs on an organization able
to bear them, rather than create a blanket rule that bars parties
258. For a further discussion of the Pro-American Needle side's external team
viability argument, see supra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
259. For a further discussion of the Pro-American Needle policy based argu-
ment, see supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
260. For a further discussion of the Pro-American Needle policy based argu-
ment, see supa notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
261. See Roberts '86 Tulane Article, supra note 71, at 577-78 ("[The Pro-NFL
approach] does not imply immunity or exemption from Section I for the firm as a
whole. It merely recognizes that a league is a single firm subject to the same anti-
trust rules and restrictions as any other single firm. A league would not be insu-
lated from Section I should it conspire with other firms to restrain competition,
nor would it ever be insulated from valid Section II claims. Thus, erroneously
characterizing single entity status as an immunity or an exemption assumes that
the single entity defense is invalid."); Grauer Michigan Article, supra note 33, at 6
(arguing for single entity status and not for Section I or Section II immunity).
262. For a further discussion of the Court's disfavor towards per se rules, see
supra note 200 and accompanying text.
263. See Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 4-7 (discussing legal consequences of
Court's ruling).
264. See id. (discussing getting past summaryjudgment). For a further discus-
sion on Rule of Reason analysis, see supra notes 30 and 37 and accompanying text.
265. See Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 21 (quoting Justice Ginsburg as say-
ing that, "Once you say no [to a per se rule], it's got to be rule of reason analysis,
they you have discovery, which can be costly.").
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with legitimate claims from the court house.266 Ultimately, even
though this game has been played fiercely by both teams before the
Supreme Court, it is now been reversed and remanded to decide
who will win.
26 7
Constantine J. Avgiris*
266. For a further discussion of the NFL's popularity and profitability, see
supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
267. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's review of American Nee-
dle, see supra notes 11-15 and 92-104 and accompanying text. For a further discus-
sion of the Pro-NFL argument, see supra notes 105-166 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of the Pro-American Needle argument, see supra notes
167-221 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Villanova University School of Law; M.B.A. Can-
didate, December 2011, Villanova University School of Business; B.S.B.A., Boston
University, 2007.
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